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Between the Economy and the Polity in the 
River Plate: Uruguay, 1811-1890 
Introduction 
This study forms part of a larger book in preparation, State Formation and 
the Origins of Democracy in the Americas: Uruguay, Colombia and 
Argentina, 1810-1890. In the larger manuscript, I compare the formation of 
the nation state in those countries and offer an explanation of both 
institutional change and the emergence of parliamentary rule in agrarian 
societies. The rationale behind the comparison is that Uruguay and Argentina 
presented two very similar economies and social contexts, but developed very 
different institutions of government. In contrast, Uruguay and Colombia saw 
the emergence of two very different social and economic contexts, but 
generated very similar political institutions. In the present paper I discuss 
different hypotheses about the emergence of democratic rule in Uruguay in 
much more detail and focus on aspects of polity formation that I only 
tangentially touch upon in the larger manuscript, which is more concerned 
with state agencies and institutions. 
At a time when large numbers of social scientists are writing copiously on 
redemocratisation, the reconstruction of democracy or its consolidation and 
future trends, a look back into the origins of democratic institutions outside 
the classic European and the closer to home case of the United States may 
help to confront some of the challenges before us. Based on the European 
experiences, the emergence of liberal democracy has been attributed to 
industrialisation and the subsequent growth of a strong bourgeoisie. Authors 
separated by more than a century, such as Karl Marx and Barrington Moore, 
have agreed that the main 'ingredient' needed for a democratic outcome was 
the existence of a 'vigorous and independent class of town dwellers'. Be that 
as it may, the Americas have given rise to liberal democracies without the 
prior flourishing of such a bourgeoisie. Whether this bourgeoisie preceded 
the rooting of liberal democracy even in the United States is still a moot 
point; in Latin America, Uruguay and other countries (such as Costa Rica or 
Colombia) present an unconventional scenario in comparison to the 'classic' 
European cases.1 
Uruguay provides an instance in which liberal democracy resulted from 
intense political mobilisation in a pastoral society that, in contrast to 
Argentina or Mexico, had neither abundant natural resources nor an 
independent cadre of modernising elites eager to transform the economy. In 
Uruguay, the factors that favoured democracy were more political than 
economic. In a comparative sense, rapid economic development has created 
conditions that were both favourable to instances of democratic reform while 
also creating powerful obstacles for the rise of parliamentary rule. The 
classic reactionary alliance of the rural and urban upper classes (which 
according to Barrington Moore were more the rule than the exception in 
Europe) were a reaction against, as well as the product of, modernisation and 
economic development.2 Democratic reform emerged in the revolutions that 
sought to undermine these alliances. In Uruguay, parliamentary rule was not 
backed up by a vigorous bourgeoisie or helped by economic development; 
however, it was facilitated by the absence of a 'reactionary configuration'.3 
A second element that favoured democracy was intense collective action 
mobilising what modernisation theory has called the 'traditional' part of 
society.4 Up until the late 1870s the modern entrepreneurial sectors of this 
small Republic were few in number and unable politically to impose their 
agenda. Political institutions developed separately from these sectors, who 
had only nominal participation in their evolution. Therefore, in contrast to 
the claims of modernisation theory, the modern part of society did not 
establish the pillar upon which parliamentary rule rested. Rather, those 
unsettled and, in the eyes of contemporaries, 'barbaric' forces that 
constituted the core of traditional society, did. Thus, a re-evaluation of 
classical postulates is needed. In agreement with Moore - and in 
disagreement with modernisation theory - I do stress that actors in the 
countryside 'deserve particular attention', but for different reasons from 
those found in his most famous book.5 
During the period in which the Uruguayan party system developed and its 
state institutions were consolidated (1811-1890), the so-called Banda Oriental 
could be best described as a backward pastoral society ravaged by wars and 
personalism, a society which only dreamers or idealists could have 
envisioned as a model of democracy.6 Yet that was precisely what it became. 
In the 1910s the country consolidated a lasting democratic rule that 
distinguished its political history from most of the less developed world. This 
was a rather early development and encouraged the idea that Uruguay was an 
exception to the rule in Latin America and the world, particularly in 
comparison to its larger and economically more powerful neighbours 
Argentina and Brazil. A short list of these 'exceptional' qualities would 
suffice to explain the views of contemporaries and the arguments of those 
who claim such 'exceptionalism'. It was the first Latin American country to 
have a Ministry of Labour and Industry and the first to pass the eight hour 
day plus additional labour legislation upon which many countries in the area 
modeled their own. In its 1917 Constitution, the country approved divorce 
and, for the first time in the Western Hemisphere, proposed a bill enacting 
the right of women to vote.7 In addition, legislation passed in the late 1910s 
protecting the rights of illegitimate children constituted both a novelty and an 
example to Latin America and the world. Among the first welfare, by the 
1920s the Banda Oriental had made a drastic breakthrough with its own past. 
As Jose Pedro Barran and Benjamin Nahum put it, 'How great the abyss that 
existed between the Uruguay we find towards the end of the Guerra Grande 
(Great War, 1839-1851), and that which was born in 1900!'8 
A minority of scholars have argued that Uruguay did not evolve into a 
democracy but rather into a corporatist state.9 This thesis rests on 
problematic assumptions. Neither in the nineteenth nor in the twentieth 
century did the Uruguayan political system develop the mechanisms of 
interest intermediation among elites that characterised corporatist 
arrangements in Europe or Latin America, particularly those established in 
its two neighbours Argentina and Brazil. In terms of its institutions the 
country developed no sign of corporatism either. Despite considerable growth 
in the public sector after the 1920s, the state and labour developed few 
linkages with one another and unions remained autonomous from state and 
parties.10 
As do most scholars, I argue that the historical record of this small 
republic shows a clear pluralist tradition. When did Uruguay really become 
democratic? It all depends on the definition of democracy one is willing to 
accept. If we believe that the existence of Congress and, above all, party 
competition marks the beginning of democratic rule, Uruguay had been 
democratic since shortly before the Guerra Grande. If we conclude that 
democracy emerges when Congress or Parliament are able to stand 
autonomous from economic and military elites, then Uruguay has been 
democratic since the late 1880s. If democracy, as both modernisation and 
Marxist theory alike have proposed, goes parallel to the development of some 
sort of industrial capital, the emergence of an urban bourgeoisie or the reign 
of the middle sectors, as Tocqueville argued for the United States, then 
Uruguay would not look democratic until the late 1940s.11 Finally, if we 
accept that democracy emerges when parliaments, congresses, and presidents 
have to be voted in by popular vote, then Uruguay was democratic from 
1911. 
Most scholarly analysis uses this last definition. This body of literature 
argues that democracy was consolidated by the elections leading to the second 
presidency (1911-1915) of the foremost Uruguayan reformer, Jose Batlle y 
Ordonez. The founder of a reform faction within the Colorado party (the 
batllistas), Batlle reached the Presidency early in the 1900s (1902-1906) and 
again in the 1911-1915 period. His administrations were characterised by a 
number of 'progressive' social and economic policies with an energetic 
populist bent which were to dominate Uruguayan political life from the early 
1900s to the 1960s.12 It was during his second administration that the 
franchise to all males was extended, and the secret ballot was adopted. 
Puzzled by the pace and character of these reforms, most work on Uruguay 
has tried to explain this turning point. Here, I intend to unravel what I see as 
a prior major turning point, i.e., the consolidation of civilian rule and final 
party dominance over the military in the late 1880s. By 1890 a different 
regime, a different polity, a different way of understanding institutions of 
government and a different bond between the political parties and the military 
had emerged. I want to explain the political system that materialised at this 
point and look for the conditions that facilitated these changes in the period 
that extends from the Wars of Independence to the late 1880s.13 
In my opinion, although I agree with the definition of democracy most 
literature has adopted, the late 1880s crystallised a crucial time of change in 
terms of party organisation and composition. A crucial year, 1886, marked 
the transition from militarism to civilian rule; as Carlos Quijano once put it, 
this was a time in which 'the carriage of [the country's] destiny changed 
horses'.14 These transformations reflected cleavages that had originated in the 
1850s and in the shifting alliances that distinguished the 1860s and the 1870s. 
It was in the aftermath of these transitions that the scenario for the reforms 
of the early 1900s was put in place. I agree with Barran and Nahum that the 
political changes of the early twentieth century came from within the state 
and owed much to the autonomy of government institutions.15 I submit, 
however, that the transformations that resulted in the regime of the 1890s 
were more the result of societal forces that operated outside the state 
apparatus than within the institutions of government. Admittedly, at that 
juncture the state had become much more autonomous and the shift to a more 
state-centred polity was increasingly possible, but it is this shift that needs 
explaining.16 These arguments are complementary rather than contradictory. 
If we accept both, we might conceive the century as two stages of polity 
formation. First, there were the transformations that made it possible for the 
state to become more autonomous (1810-1880).17 Second, starting in the late 
1870s a different phase of polity formation began in which the state grew in 
terms of its autonomy and capacity, facilitating the reforms of the 1880s and 
the early twentieth century. 
A brief examination of current hypotheses about the nature of batllismo 
leads to the conclusion that events in the 1890s were crucial to explain the 
success of reform in the following century. A first hypothesis argues that the 
exceptional leadership qualities of Jose Batlle y Ordonez were aided by the 
exceptionally propitious atmosphere for reform created by the economic 
prosperity experienced by the country in the early part of the 20th century. 
Basically, favourable terms of exchange with Britain persuaded economic 
elites that they could afford reform. Unfortunately, this hypothesis rests on 
shaky grounds. Not only is it doubtful that the 'bonanza' of the early 20th 
century was such that it 'convinced' the elites of going along with Colorado 
reformers, but also we must remember that any export 'bonanza' came only 
later. Most figures situate the peak of the Uruguayan export industry in the 
1920s and even much later in the late 1930s, long after political reform had 
been initiated.18 
In other versions, the development of manufacturing plus the consequent 
formation of an early proletariat and the characteristics of the 
industry/agriculture cleavage all combined to help the leader. Incipient as it 
was, industrialisation and the formation of an early proletariat benefited 
reform because the establishment of slaughter houses in Montevideo attracted 
large numbers of workers who ended up backing Batlle's agenda. The 
enfranchisement of foreign workers and new arrivals from the countryside 
only increased and deepened support for reform. Both those who stressed the 
populist aspect of Batllismo and those who criticised Batlle as a demagogue 
have endorsed this position.19 In addition, since industry constituted a 
forward linkage for Uruguayan agriculture, Batlle gained the backing of 
landowning elites who saw future gains in his project of industrialisation. All 
of the above increased the power of urban political interests over the 
agrarian, more conservative sectors. In an ironic twist, shared interests 
between industry and agriculture eventually evolved to the disadvantage of 
the conservative agrarians. 
These are problematic propositions. Rather than a 'from the bottom up' 
reform based on working class support, from 1903 to the first serious effort 
at industrialisation (circa 1930) what we really find is a democracy imposed 
from above. Interpretations seeing this turning point as a political system 
commanded by a 'democratic bourgeoisie' that went hand in hand with the 
'vigorous impulse' of industrialisation experienced by the country starting in 
the 1870s rest on no solid empirical grounds.20 Even in the 1940s, when 
industrialisation was at its peak, it was too limited and modest to create a 
industrial-like bourgeoisie. And not all of the industrial bourgeoisie 
necessarily favour democracy. Working class support for the first Presidency 
was confined and moderate, and cannot explain the success of democratic 
reform. Although industrial establishments - mainly associated with the beef 
and wool trade - employed relatively large numbers of workers, they were 
not numerous enough to explain urban social change and a (more 
questionable) change in political behaviour. By and large, the country 
exhibited a rather incipient industrial base. Concentration was no doubt high: 
by 1926 about 20 per cent of the total workforce was concentrated in 0.2 per 
cent of establishments. However, there were very few industrial enterprises 
of this type.21 In reality the support of workers of reform initiatives came 
later, in Batlle's second administration, and obviously cannot explain how 
Batlle reached the presidency in his first term. 
Let me add that, given the limited extension of the franchise to foreigners, 
the popular mass-support thesis is problematic even to explain Batlle's second 
term. Surely by that time direct popular suffrage benefited the elected 
president, but less than half of the urban citizenry in fact voted. Very 
importantly, the characterisation of the agrarians as a conservative bloc 
defeated by a working class who supported reform lacks accuracy. As 
indicated, it was precisely the absence of a conservative bloc that 
characterised Uruguayan political development. 
Batlle's access to power responded, instead, to shifting alliances within the 
previous government; it was the already established political elite who voted 
Batlle into the presidency. Changes came from above and within government 
institutions. State autonomy had been carved out with the assistance of 
political parties. Although the well-established equation of strong parties and 
weak state, weak parties and strong state still applies here, what is interesting 
about their parallel development is that, in the end, both state and parties 
gained a relative autonomy which contributed greatly to the emergence of 
democracy. It was on the basis of disorderly, but autonomous, parties that the 
state built up its autonomy. Two major parties that had penetrated the 
military and did not represent the most entrepreneurial sectors of the 
economic elites, plus a state that had remained relatively divorced from upper 
economic groups, were the major salient characteristics of the political 
system that Batlle inherited. The study of the conditions under which this 
situation emerged occupies the rest of this discussion. 
My focus on polity formation necessarily leads to an analysis of the 
institutions of government and the state.22 Yet while I see state institutions as 
very important in terms of the practices they impose on policy-making, I keep 
a clear distinction between institutions and regimes and I am interested more 
in explaining changes in the latter than in the former. The reason is 
straightforward: state institutions may not change or expand (in terms of 
agencies and organisation), but substantial regime changes may occur that 
have great impact on polity formation. For example, if we were to accept that 
constitutions do provide a good variable to detect political change, then 
Uruguay would seem not to have changed much during the nineteenth 
century.23 What I show below, however, is precisely the opposite. Contrary 
to what may appear at first sight, the reasons for not changing the original 
document were precisely related to rapid transformations in political 
coalitions rather than to the consolidation of a conservative, pro-constitution 
alliance. Not that there was agreement about its virtues. Constitutional 
reform was a highly controversial issue that frequently led to long and often 
rancorous legislative debate.24 However, after prolonged armed struggle in 
which Uruguayans confronted several foreign invasions, the document 
became a symbol of the newly acquired nationality so that any attempt to 
change it or to modify the state bureaucracy that it called for came to be 
perceived as a move against the motherland.25 Furthermore, because it gave 
power to the executive branch and discouraged the formation of interest 
groups (specifically, by not including the right of citizens to organise in 
associations), when in office both major parties took to its defence and when 
in opposition they mildly criticised it. Political elites in control of the state 
retained their leverage over the economic elites precisely by following a 
constitution that discouraged direct connections between the state and 
organised economic groups. 
As is more often than not the case, political practice deviated from the 
actual guidelines of the original document, but the institutional design that it 
proposed remained basically intact until 1917. Even then, the modifications 
that it went through were somewhat mild. If we conceive institutional change 
as transformations in party organisation, then in this sense institutional 
change was apparent. By the mid-1880s the parties had been transformed both 
organisationally and in terms of their composition. Yet considering the 
extended process of guerrilla warfare that they themselves led and that shook 
the country over the whole nineteenth century, together with the rapid 
succession of different regimes that they generated, organisational 
transformations were not drastic. For their part, state agencies and 
institutions did not change much until the late 1870s either. Thus, this was a 
process of polity formation in which, despite vigorous party activity and 
protracted struggle between the parties, for more than 60 years parties and 
the state changed little while coalitions and regimes changed much. Crucial 
turning points in polity formation are better measured by detecting changes 
in governmental coalitions than transformations in institutions per se. 
Careful examination of historical data for this case has convinced me that 
political history is best understood by identifying major breakthroughs. 
Rather than a continuous line of events that in increments changed the 
contours of Uruguay's historical development, I found that for the most part 
the political system changed through drastic and rapid fractures and that these 
fractures do not always coincide with transformations in the institutions of 
government. Periods of rapid political transformation allow us to identify the 
new and better to study the old. I have chosen 1811-1890 because the period 
includes the wars of independence and the final consolidation of civilian rule, 
which set the scene for the democratic reforms of the early twentieth century. 
It includes three distinguishable turning points. 
The first was the wars of independence (1811-1828) in which Uruguay 
fought against Spain, Brazil and Portugal and developed a conflictive 
relationship with Argentina, particularly with the Province of Buenos Aires. 
Unlike customary arguments that have seen the wars of independence and 
their aftermath as mild reforms that in some cases even reconstruct part of 
the colonial past, I see this period as one of radical revolution. The regimes 
that emerged after these wars bore little resemblance to the pre-war ancien 
regime, and as such they represent a completely new political phenomenon. 
Recently, Gordon Wood has made a very similar argument for the United 
States. Very much as I do for Uruguay, he contends that the American war 
of independence was a radical revolution much more than a defence of US 
rights against British encroachment that preserved rather than changed US 
society.26 After 1811, a revolution also transformed Uruguayan society and 
culture, breaking away from the earlier way of conducting politics. Although 
in essence a radical liberal revolution, it was not accompanied by any sign of 
economic development; while these years marked a breach with the past 
institutionally and politically, the economy of the country, if anything, 
reverted to the worst aspects of colonial rule. The economic and political 
spheres neither adjusted to customary theories of development nor did they 
both change at the same pace or at the same time. In the following years this 
pattern continued, the polity changing rapidly with the economy showing no 
signs of any modernisation up until the 'wool revolution' of the 1860s. 
In the second half of the 1870s there was a second turning point with the 
administration of Colonel Francisco Latorre (1876-1880). At that time, 
political change triggered economic change and set the scene for a regime 
that finally tied economy and government closer together. Until 1886 
militarism permeated the political system, party activity lessened, and a 
coalition consolidated behind a different regime whose goals were economic 
development and modernisation. However, this alliance did not hold for long, 
and a third breach occurred in the late 1880s when militarism ended and 
civilian parliamentary rule re-emerged. My analysis ends in 1890, after 
civilian supremacy was established. 
Part I offers a review of the existing literature on Uruguay. My purpose 
is twofold. First, I intend to extract the main lines of argument in this 
literature and to formulate its explicit and also its implicit theses. Second, by 
going over these sources my aim is to introduce the reader to a substantial 
part of the history of the country. The rest of the essay offers a reworking of 
some of the 'weak spots' found in the literature and an alternative 
interpretation which includes some additional evidence as well as 
comparisons with other countries. 
I. Uruguayan Democracy and its Interpreters 
The Exceptional Country Thesis 
From very early on Uruguay was considered an 'exception'; however this is 
not mirrored in the literature. Scholarly writings on other American countries 
that consolidated democratic regimes during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries - the United States, Costa Rica or Colombia, for instance 
- consider them exceptions. For the most part, this literature discouraged 
comparisons and encouraged parochialism. By the 1950s Uruguayan 
exceptionality had gained widespread recognition particularly within the 
ruling Colorado (Red) party and pervaded the ideology of the whole political 
elite, becoming an organic part of the discourse of the other major party, the 
Blanco (White) party as well as the Left.27 This last party and most of the Left 
also concluded that Uruguay had been an exception in the Americas, a unique 
experiment that had no parallel in the new world. The Blancos, or National 
Party, argued that there were unique features to the Creole inhabitants of the 
motherland and during the late 1960s and early 1970s the MLN (National 
Liberation Movement, or Tupamaros) not only argued for the exceptionality 
of the country but also for that of the movement.28 One of the most radical 
expressions of the exceptionality thesis was articulated by the so-called neo-
Batllismo movement that dominated Uruguayan politics during the 1950s and 
early 1960s.29 In believing their country an exception, politicians and 
academics joined the great majority of common citizens who since elementary 
school had been told that 'como el Uruguay, no hay' (there is no place like 
Uruguay). It can be argued that until the 1970s most Uruguayan 
historiography claimed exceptionality.30 Academic work on Uruguay done in 
the United States and Britain also reflected this view.31 
Exceptional country arguments varied and what I call a 'thesis' is really 
the loose articulation of claims of different nature that somewhat 
unsystematically surfaced in the literature. I distinguish four major 
variations. 
The first was that Uruguay was born democratic by means of its 
distinctive, 'native' political culture. This political culture found its origins 
in the indigenous Uruguayan people who, by their very nature, 'had been 
born' fighting foreign invaders and authoritarianism. These consisted of 
gauchos, the so-called cowboys of South America, Indians who had lived in 
Jesuit missions until the expulsion of the Order, deserters from Spanish and 
Portuguese armies as well as unruly indians of Charrua, Guarani or Chana 
origin. Creole elites, who flourished prior to the arrival of larger waves of 
European immigrants characteristic of the later part of the century, were 
added to this native group to form the body of the 'precursor nationals'.32 In 
other words, the rebellious character of the gaucho together with the 
nationalist ideology generated by the wars of independence were supposed to 
have forged an exceptionally good predisposition for liberal democracy.33 
While during the twentieth century the native-culture argument was inspired 
by the romanticism of the 1930s and 1940s, venerable classics such as 
Francisco Bauza also subscribed to it.34 Rousseauian notions of incorruptible 
natural freedom and a celebration of the 'bon sauvage' inspired this political 
culture argument and with romantic flavour depicted modernisation as 
depravity and the intrusion of foreigners in the affairs of the republic as 
detrimental to its 'natural' development.35 Frequent references to an 
honourable rebellious indigenous past went back to the 1870s, when Juan 
Zorrilla de San Martin wrote his Leyenda Patria, a novel that attempted to 
capture the origins of the political culture and popular myths surrounding the 
creation of the country.36 Thus, similar to S. M. Upset's The First New 
Nation and most work done on the foundation of the United States during the 
1950s and 1960s, this literature insisted that from the very start Uruguay 
shaped a political culture in which individual freedom and resistance against 
tyranny and authoritarianism were fundamental.37 Apparently this positive 
appraisal of the role of gauchos and Indians contrasted sharply with the views 
of others, who saw in these unruly masses a dangerous, disruptive and 
barbaric force that threatened the very foundations of rational politics.38 In 
formulating a different type of political culture argument, a second variant 
of the exceptional country thesis incorporated some of these misgivings about 
the rough and by nature anti-democratic instincts of the rural masses. In this 
version, the special political culture of thtorientales resulted from the rapid 
pace of urbanisation of the capital city and the large European immigration 
it sheltered. Comparable only to Buenos Aires, by mid-century Montevideo 
looked, in the eyes of contemporaries, like a modern city. As early as 1852 
the city sheltered 25.7 per cent of the total population of the country and 37.2 
per cent of all Uruguayans could be classified as urban. Although, as Barran 
and Nahum have argued, most of these urbanites still lived immersed in a 
rural lifestyle, it is undeniable that the pace of urbanisation was fast. As they 
themselves recognised, by 1908 about half of the total population of the 
country could be classified as urban, culturally and occupationally.39 A 
porteno newspaper in 1867 put it this way: 
'Comparisons are not detrimental when there is a need for them. 
Montevideo, the Queen of the Plata, surpasses Buenos Aires by 
about one hundred years ... Really, Montevideo makes the Plata 
River proud ... There is nothing in Buenos Aires that can be 
compared with Montevideo's streets ... since (they) rival 
Sackville Street and other European cities.'40 
By 1830 Uruguay had 74,000 inhabitants, of which 14,000 lived in the 
capital city. In 1843 a French observer came to the interesting conclusion that 
there were more French residents in Montevideo than in Algeria, a country 
that had been under French domination since 1830. By 1867, the population 
of Montevideo had grown to almost 130,000 - 75,000 of whom were foreign 
born. Although Spaniards were a majority among them, they outnumbered 
other groups only by a small margin. In 1879 Ippolito Garrou, Italian Consul 
General at Montevideo, reported on the distribution of the foreign population 
and wrote that according to a 1877 revised census Spaniards in the city 
outnumbered Italians only by 400. Moreover, he recorded that since the year 
1839 the number of Italian immigrants arriving in Montevideo was much 
larger than any other group (including Spaniards, French, Brazilians and 
British, all of whom constituted a large presence).41 By 1891 there were 
150,000 inhabitants in the city, who represented 29.66 per cent of the total 
population of the country; by the 1900s it had increased to 270,000.42 The 
proportion of foreigners in the capital increased even more because of a 
double immigration pattern: while Europeans remained in Montevideo, 
Creoles who had established residence in the city migrated to the 
countryside.43 
Juan E. Pivel Devoto, Washington Reyes Abadie and Arturo Zum Felde 
stressed that the rural areas and the capital city were two worlds apart, 
culturally and politically, and that modernity was measured by the pace of 
urbanisation.44 They were joined by others (among them Carlos Real de 
Azua) in arguing that what was unique about Uruguay was that, unlike the 
rest of Latin America, the city quickly conquered the countryside. 
Contemporaries also stressed a 'divorce' between urban political discourse 
and the 'real stuff of politics in society as a whole. One can claim that F. 
Sarmiento's aspiration in Facundo: o la civilization y la barbarie, or John 
Stuart Mill's argument about the influences of urban life, seemed to have 
become true in the small republic. If the formation of political organisations 
in the urban environment were to be taken as a sign of the imposition of the 
urbanites over the 'barbaric' rural masses, then Montevideo can be said to 
have set the tone of political debate for the country as a whole. Urban politics 
became the modus vivendi of large sectors of the urban classes, most of 
whom had lost property due to protracted armed conflict. Particularly in the 
early 1850s and by the end of the Guerra Grande the political elite augmented 
its numbers substantially. While since the early 1800s the urban elites had 
sent their sons to study abroad or (later) to the local law school, by the end 
of that war and facing declining economic opportunities these young men saw 
in politics a means to secure social influence. A brotherhood of notables that 
had long characterised urban politics under the cabildo system, merged with 
these professionals to form a growing body of full-time politicians. These 
newcomers and most of the old political bosses were, by origin, tied to the 
merchant class of Montevideo, some of whom had invested in land after the 
completion of the wars of independence. Hacendados ruined by the war also 
joined. Altogether, they made up the group called the urban 'patriciado', or 
the 'doctors', a sneering reference to educated learning.45 
Urban politicking appeared to have little to do with the interests of the 
provinces, or departamentos. In 1850, a perceptive observer of his times, 
Luis Melian Lafinur, characterised the Camaras (Parliament) as epitomising 
a completely different sphere of activity from the apparent ethos of an 
agrarian society such as then existed, characterised by armed struggle and 
low levels of technology, and internally weakened by political chaos. He 
stressed that the Camaras housed intellectuals whose brilliant speeches and 
debates 'did not fit' at all with the country's needs and reality. Lafinur called 
the Senate and the House of Representatives ' Camaras bizantinas'. And both 
Reyes Abadie and Alberto Zum Felde described the institutions of 
government as the most exquisite site of philosophical and political debate: 
'a Parliament which is not a Parliament, but an Academy, a government that 
is not a body of government, but an Ateneo'.46 Sophisticated discourse and 
awkward political practice made a target for bitter criticism as political 
theorising in the Camaras contrasted with the stark and violent reality facing 
'this unfortunate Republic'.47 In sum, although an agrarian society little 
different from those of Central America, the small country was exceptional 
because of the European-like Montevideo, which was closer to the 'Greek 
cities of antiquity' or the political dynamics of the municipalities of medieval 
Italy than to the realities of the rest of the area. 
The early emergence of an urban middle class added to this sense of 
exceptionalism and this led to academic comparisons with Europe. Research 
on the class composition of the city shows that by the early 1900s about 40 
per cent of the urban population could be considered middle class.48 
Numerous European arrivals to the urban environment allowed for a 
'reproduction' of European traditions which, when followed in the new small 
country, provided the basis of a democratic political culture. Although it was 
never explicitly stated, insistence on these exceptional trends pointed to the 
superiority of the country on account of its strong European ancestry 49 
Emphasis on the positive influence of Europeans on democracy contradicted 
prior arguments about the Spanish heritage of Latin America. Rather than 
contributing to progress during the 1930s and 1940s, several authors argued 
that Spain had endowed these countries with the 'dual scourges' of economic 
underdevelopment and a political ethos of authoritarianism. Reasoning that 
by the time of the conquest the physical and social sciences were not 
adequately developed in Spain, and because of the exportation to the New 
World of a rigid system of social stratification, combined with the strong 
influence of a very conservative Church, such authors held that Spain had set 
Latin America on a regressive path which fatally condemned it to a 
permanently secondary status in comparison to other lands of recent 
settlement such as the United States and Canada. At bottom, Spanish 
immigration had been detrimental for advancement and civil liberties; 
Italians, the second major European group arriving to the New World, had 
not fared much better. Such arguments, however, were not universally 
accepted. An alternative corpus of work emerged stressing that the Spanish 
legacy and the later European migrations were really a blessing to thzBanda 
and the continent in general. In a very interesting discussion of this literature, 
in 1946 Julio Martinez Lamas suggested that 
the spiritual incapacity of the Spaniards was simply the 
consequence of a special kind of environment (Spain). When this 
environment was gone, or, better put, the Spaniard was 
transplanted outside of it, his incapacity disappeared 
proportionally to the intensity of the existing difference between 
the new environment and the prior one ... when their children ... 
purified their surroundings and widely opened their frontiers ... 
the Spaniards who continued to be incorporated to free America 
were and are as intelligent, laborious, and principled as the sons 
of the most privileged countries ...'50 
According to Martinez Lamas, the major difference between North and 
South America was not to be found in their different colonisers, but in the 
natural resources and the distances that separated them from Europe.51 As far 
as comparisons went, Martinez Lamas was right when he insinuated that the 
United States was a worthwhile comparison. We can add that, in fact, Europe 
could neither offer very many cases of newly emerging democracies 
comparable to the ones emerging in Latin America, nor for the most part 
good instances of advanced social legislation or political liberties. In terms 
of institutions, pace of development, immigration, the formation of a middle 
class, and party organisation, it was another new country - the United States 
- that provided the real parameter of comparison. Unfortunately, to this day 
comparative work including the United States has been virtually non-
existent.52 Martinez Lamas was also right when, unlike exceptionalism and 
despite his defence of Spanish immigrants, he did not upgrade the cultural 
influence of white Europeans to be the most determining factor in forging a 
political culture of democracy. As we shall see, this was really of secondary 
importance. 
To conclude, these two sides of the 'exceptional country' thesis conflicted 
with one another in terms of causality and derivative hypotheses because they 
formulated contradictory political culture arguments. On the one hand, 
democracy had found its roots in a political culture that originated in the 
struggle of native Uruguayans against the Spanish, French, British and 
Portuguese invaders. Indians and Mestizos (those of mixed Indian and white 
blood) were the major actors in this drama, which combined their quest for 
freedom with life in the open plains. On the other hand, it was the growth of 
the city and the influence of European immigrants that in the long run had 
brought democracy to a generally uncivilised reality. As is usually the case 
with political culture arguments neither one of them spelled out the precise 
conditions under which these particular political cultures could be attainable 
and, more importantly, whether or not the political culture constituted the 
cause or the product of a given political system that still needed to be 
explained. As we shall see, political culture was, if anything, a dependent 
variable; the tangible pillars of democratic reform were built through war, 
intense rural mobilisation, and the penetration of the military by the political 
parties. 
There was a third political culture argument that was also a part of the 
exceptional country school of thought. In this version, a unique democratic 
political culture had originated as a result of the country's bountiful natural 
resource endowment. An uncommon geographical situation and climate, the 
advantages of its small size, its incomparable plains and forests, its natural 
seaport and its extraordinary waterfront plus the exceptional quality of 
livestock production were all brought to bear on this type of singular culture. 
An anonymous contemporary wrote in 1863 that 
'Of all sections of the Americas and in particular of the River 
Plate...none has made more progress than ...the Oriental 
Republic. None in the same proportion has developed commercial 
ties with Europe, none is more likely to offer newer and more 
diverse products, none has better geographical and economic 
conditions and none can present to European immigration and 
Commerce [a] better situation of stability, growth, wealth, future 
and employment.'53 
Surprisingly given its scarce natural resources and constant state of turmoil, 
years later (1892) even the Bureau of American Republics argued that 
'To no other country in the world has nature been more lavish in 
her favors than to the Eastern Republic of the Uruguay; nowhere 
has she gathered or distributed more favorable conditions of life 
or national prosperity than in the comparatively small 
republic...'54 
Thus, this liberal political culture was seen not as the product of industrial 
development, but of plain natural riches; abundance helped to alleviate social 
tension and explained its dominant middle-class composition. 
As with other versions of 'exceptional type' arguments, literature on other 
countries also noted their respective extraordinary resource endowments and 
some kind of privileged status in order to argue for exceptionality or to 
wonder how it could be possible that countries with such vast resources 
should perform so poorly economically. Venerable scholarly traditions such 
as dependency theory contrasted what was perceived as excellent natural 
resources with the institutional instability and authoritarian tendencies of less 
developed countries. More often than not, however, assessments of real 
possibilities or handicaps are too simplistic. Literature on Uruguay was 
rather optimistic. Despite its dependent status and small size (which limited 
its resources considerably), the country was perceived as a promised land 
well suited for democracy. Rather than a curse, smallness turned out a 
blessing. In Rousseauian overtones it was suggested that only in a small 
society could democracy develop its true self.55 Despite its modest industrial 
development, the small republic was highly conducive to the growth and 
development of a middle class, and despite its reduced participation in 
overseas trade - compared to its two 'giant' neighbours - small Uruguay 
seemed to have benefited culturally the most from its connections with 
Europe. 
A fourth variation of the exceptional country thesis stressed the 
extraordinary qualities of Uruguayan political leadership. I call this 
interpretation the 'exceptional leader' hypothesis. Like its counterparts, this 
hypothesis was by no means alien to Latin American historiography.56 In a 
nutshell, it claimed that Uruguayan political leaders were more liberal, more 
democratic, and had greater leadership skills. For the most part it flourished 
as an explanation of the exceptional statesmanship of Don Jose Batlle y 
Ordonez; in the English language, Milton Vanger's work on Batlle constitutes 
the best example.57 In Uruguay, much work on Batllism had been inspired by 
the same postulates. Gonzalez Conci and Guidici, for instance, described the 
initiation of the Batllista reforms in the following terms: 
'The social environment is primitive. The people are engaged in 
an intense process of moral and political dissolution, corrupted by 
the barbaric hands of dictators; (they had) consented ... to their 
fate ... in the immense desolation of their disgrace and spiritual 
poverty. But then, Battle arrived.'58 
From these stark versions in which the rise of democracy was attributed 
entirely to the influence of one single individual, literature inspired by this 
approach evolved into milder versions that sought a 'combination' formula 
that included the exceptional skills of the leader and structural factors (see 
above).59 While the exceptional leader hypothesis has been mostly applied to 
Batlle y Ordonez, the role of leaders and their skills in polity formation had 
also been a characteristic of the literature in the nineteenth century. Most of 
this literature argued for the outstanding personality of caudillos to explain 
party formation and the very rise of the nation state. Party founders such as 
Juan Antonio Lavalleja and Fructuoso Rivera plus a succession of other 
caudillos (Manuel Oribe, Venancio Flores, Timoteo Aparicio, Aparicio 
Saravia, etc) had been the creators of the political system. As discussed 
below, there is some truth to this claim; yet the interesting question is why 
and how caudillos gained such a central role. 
White Europeans in a Land of Recent Settlement 
As discussed above, one prevalent political culture claim argued that liberal 
democracy was the result of the large numbers of European immigrants who, 
since the early nineteenth century, had reached Uruguayan shores. Combined 
with structural variables, this contention comes very close to 'lands of recent 
settlement' theory. Clearly, Uruguay fits perfectly in this last group; 
according to Adam Smith, these were countries that were more prone to 
develop liberal democracy than those in which more advanced colonisers had 
to exploit the labour of a pre-existing society. Similar to the situation that 
Frederick Turner described for the United States or Innis for Canada, 
Uruguay was, as Charles Darwin depicted it, 'a rather empty country' whose 
institutions were built upon a weak colonial background and large numbers 
of European immigrants.60 Yet, despite frequent references in the literature 
to the characteristics of recent settlement of the small republic, only one 
explicit allusion to the theory can be found.61 Similar to arguments about the 
United States, landscape and people blended perfectly to create a cult of 
freedom and independence. For all practical purposes, the rural areas 
provided the equivalent to the US frontier.62 In short, literature on these 
countries built upon the assumption that 'empty new lands' with scarce labour 
and sparse indigenous populations having little impact on society were more 
prone to democracy. 
Such a view is neither new nor confined to academic circles. In 1887 the 
Spanish Consul reported that, while progress was making inroads in the small 
republic, a propensity to democracy was also evident thank to the emptiness 
of the land and the overwhelming majority of Europeans: 
' . . . the European population exceeds 300,000 souls among whom 
60,000 were Spaniards ... (the country) enjoys a happy and 
prosperous condition, which contributes to the prosperity of the 
Peninsula because it promotes mercantile relations. Because these 
countries are empty they must encourage foreign populations to 
establish residence and therefore they must also establish 
democratic principles of government, conditions of equity that 
shall please the foreigner who ... comes to these lands to find a 
better morrow; this, he easily finds whatever his profession or the 
purchasing of lands at extremely inexpensive price. ... The 
confusion and disorder of Democratic Governments is charming 
and even convenient for immigrant classes who have no interest 
in taking a retrospective look upon a pretty daunting past. 
Whatever the origin of foreigners might have been at arrival in 
these countries ...[they] can with either merit or disposition forge 
a prosperous future and marry the daughters of the highest public 
officials or the wealthiest bankers.'63 
A major problem in this vein of thought lies in the virtual absence of 
comparative work needed to test such propositions. Another land of recent 
settlement (Argentina) would have provided an ideal comparative case. Such 
comparison poses a challenge both to political culture and lands of recent 
settlement arguments. While these two countries shared a very similar social 
and economic make up, during the nineteenth century Argentina gave rise to 
much more centralised and authoritarian regimes, had a harder time 
consolidating a party system and developed a much stronger military 
establishment. Furthermore, while for most of the twentieth century Uruguay 
remained pluralist and parliamentary, Argentina experienced several versions 
of authoritarianism and corporatism. In a word, while very similar 
structurally and socially, the political cultures and the institutions of 
government of both countries were quite different. 
Political culture and lands of recent settlement arguments run into 
additional difficulties when tested against cases that did not host large 
numbers of European immigrants and nevertheless evolved into parliamentary 
democracies. Colombia, with few European immigrants to speak of, a larger 
indigenous population in comparison to Argentina and Uruguay and a 
completely different economy from that of the River Plate, developed stable 
party systems in the context of parliamentary democracy. In conclusion, 
lands of recent settlement (Argentina, Uruguay) can give rise to different 
state institutions and political cultures, while countries outside that group can 
still reproduce the political culture and the institutions that the theory 
connects with the first set of countries. 
Ideas and political organisations 
Classic work on party formation has taken ideology to be the major thrust 
behind the formation of the two major parties, the Blancos and the Colorados. 
Since the 1830s Uruguay developed two major parties that monopolised most 
instances of collective action and had a major influence in shaping the 
contours of the emerging polity. Because these two parties were very similar 
in terms of composition, to explain the cleavages that divided them has been 
a challenging task. Juan Pivel Devoto's classic work on party formation 
argued, among other things, that ideas constituted the major force behind 
party differentiation.64 He also stressed the personalities of leaders. Partly as 
a result of his work and the application of models of party formation 
borrowed from elsewhere, ideologically the Colorados have been identified 
as liberal reformers and the Blancos as the more traditional, rural-based 
conservatives.65 Although never clearly spelled out, the hypothesis maintains 
that the final triumph of the Colorado Party (which has been considered the 
'moderniser' within the party system), plus its ability to establish several 
hegemonic periods during the nineteenth century, contributed much to the 
developments of the 1880s and the consolidation of democracy in the 1900s.66 
Liberalism was perceived as a major force behind the parties and the final 
triumph of liberal democracy. Some have even suggested that liberal and 
'progressive' ideas imported from Europe found more receptive ears here 
than elsewhere.67 As Seymour M. Lipset and Louis Hartz argued for the 
United States, liberal ideas were argued to be a major force behind 
institutional transformation, pervading all spheres of social and political 
activity.68 Was liberalism such an important factor in the formation of the 
Uruguayan polity? Were 'European ideas' the main cleavage dividing the 
parties? No doubt all this played a role in the structuring of political 
discourse. The typical combination of liberalism, the enlightenment, Spanish 
collectivism, empiricism, and later on positivism and Darwinism influenced 
the political elite. North American political thought was also influential, and 
the federalist papers gained some popularity.69 Liberalism coloured vivid 
speeches in the Camaras, inspired lectures and induced numerous newspaper 
articles.70 Yet adherence to liberal ideas was too common a phenomenon in 
both parties to identify them as a main cleavage. 
Although in early periods of party formation there were more liberals 
among the more cosmopolitan Colorados than among the Blancos, by the 
1870s (the decade in which liberalism, as Pivel Devoto put it, 'commanded 
all the acts of the legislators') liberalism became dominant in both the parties' 
'progressive' wings.71 Both argued for the weakest possible state and even 
protested the creation of the Banco Nacional, because they considered its 
foundation an encroachment upon the private sector.72 And it was at this 
precise time that the party system started to consolidate; in the next two 
decades Blancos and Colorados were to absorb new liberal-inspired urban-
based parties and consolidate their party machines. After the peace of 1872 
both parties agreed to 'co-participate' in government and Blancos gained the 
administration of four departamentos or provinces. New political 
organisations inspired by liberalism emerged at this point. It was the political 
ambition of urban upper classes and professional politicians who provided 
their backbone, attempting to challenge the predominance of the two 
'traditional' parties.73 Lawyers, physicians and accountants or doctors 
organised the so-called Partidos de Ideas (as opposed to the parties led by 
caudillos) and adhered to liberal discourse through principismo.74 This was 
about imposing new rules on the existing political game, ending corruption 
in vote counting and assuring that electoral results were respected by 
incumbents. Partidos de Ideas were the closest to Liberal parties that 
Uruguay had in the 19th century, and their importance lay more in their 
success at modernising the old party machines (by finally merging with the 
so-called 'traditional' parties) than in their liberalism. In fact, by merging 
they diluted their original fidelity to classic liberal precepts.75 
Why didn't the Partidos de Ideas prevail? Their decline as independent 
organisations was connected with the opposition they confronted from both 
urban and rural quarters. By the mid-1870s, and in spite of its commitment 
to modernisation, the coalition that formed behind state-builder Colonel 
Francisco Latorre (1876-1880) looked at the doctors with scepticism and 
mistrusted their 'idealism'. In the countryside, despite shared common 
interests between the pro-modernisation Asociacion Rural (founded in 1871) 
and the doctors in weakening the political power of caudillos, the Asociacion 
fiercely opposed the principistas because, according to them, they did not 
represent in the least el pais real (the real country).76 The rural masses 
considered the doctors and their parties outright enemies. In the rural areas, 
where crucial political organising took place, liberal ideology was rather 
weak. Some caudillos borrowed liberal ideas and defended individual rights, 
but their behaviour responded more to specific local circumstances than to the 
influence of liberal doctrines that, by and large, they scorned. 
In sum, although I view political ideologies as a 'political glue' that was 
able to provide resilient linkages between individuals and organisation and 
regard liberalism as an important influence, I do not see them as the main 
cleavage that divided the parties. If anything, liberalism contributed to the 
opposite; sporadic alliances between liberal factions of the two parties took 
place quite frequently. By the same token, however, these alliances could 
never break the barriers dividing the two parties because the cleavages that 
separated them lay elsewhere. Pivel Devoto himself showed that in the 1880s 
liberal-inspired principistas ended up joining both parties.77 
Rather than ideology, others have resorted to psychological explanations 
to explain the parties and their cleavages. Roberto Ares Pons argued that 
'In his unconscious search for a father image, the gaucho finds 
the caudillo, and in his search for God, the Motherland or la 
Divisa. Both loyalties are related, as the obscure intimacy of the 
psyche relate fraternal and religious feelings. This explains the ... 
irrational adherence ... to banners and causes that contribute 
nothing to analytical thinking.'78 
Martinez Lamas submitted that the parties embodied 'sentiments' rather than 
ideas and that they were the product of emotions rather than rationality.79 He 
explained the establishment of these 'two political collectivities' as the result 
of love and loyalty to the heroes of the Independence movement. No doubt 
loyalties played a role, yet these explanations do not address the question of 
how these emotional attachments survived generations after the wars of 
Independence were over, or after the first founding caudillos disappeared 
from the political scene. In addition there is no explanation as to why political 
organisations here expressed these psychological mechanisms while 
elsewhere they were considered the product of rational choice. In the final 
analysis the common interests that kept these two 'collectivities' together 
remained obscure. 
Some important evidence seems to suggest that a major cleavage dividing 
the parties was the difference between educated urbanite party leaders and the 
ignorant masses, between the doctors and the candomberos.m Pivel Devoto 
had identified this divide as crucial and Arturo Zum Felde argued along these 
lines when he insisted that the antagonism between the two parties was an 
expression of the existing split between 'on the one side doctors and on the 
other the caudillos with their massive following'.81 Clashes between these 
groups have also been detected by others.82 Although a very important 
development, a major problem with this interpretation is that it better 
explains divisions within both the Blancos and the Colorados than the 
cleavages dividing them (see above). Very importantly, in neither of the 
parties did doctors or caudillos predominate, so that characterising the parties 
as a party of doctors or as a party of caudillos is misleading. 
A reworking of some explanations serves us better. As we shall see, more 
is to be gained by focusing on the process by which parties captured different 
geographical constituencies. In a country in which wars sharply divided city 
and countryside, one party became more rural-based and the other more 
urban-based, a cleavage that endured until the 1920s. Strong clientelistic 
networks built upon war were also important in party formation and ensuring 
cleavages; they divided the country in different zones, with the parties 
operating on the basis of captured constituencies. It is apparent from the 
historical record that, for all practical purposes, up until the 1870s parties 
were military organisations that fought for control of the central state and the 
port of Montevideo. Alliances with different groups in the capital city, 
crucial to consolidate control in case of a victory, also divided the parties and 
provided Colorado and Blanco linkages between city and countryside. To 
these factors we must add two more. The first was a constant fear of armed 
insurrection from below that encouraged connections among leaders in 
different departamentos and stimulated the formation of horizontal alliances. 
Fear was also conducive to party maintenance because it kept leaders in 
constant contact with the rural poor and allowed leaders to monitor the rank 
and file more efficiently. The second was the influence of regional factors on 
the parties. Colorados and Blancos started off as alliances with Brazilians and 
Argentines and the parties retained these connections up until the 1910s. This 
further encouraged interregional alliances and the formation of a national 
front. Regionally, pro-Brazilian or Argentine factions allied in accordance, 
contributing to form two larger national coalitions, the Colorados and the 
Blancos. 
Structural factors and Uruguayan development 
Structuralist-type arguments made major scholarly inroads during the 1970s 
and 1980s; the work of Barran and Nahum and of Lucia Sala de Touron and 
associates represent the major works here.83 The contribution of the former 
has still no parallel in the literature on nineteenth and early twentieth century 
Latin America. Reyes Abadie and Vazquez Romero's encyclopaedic volumes 
on Uruguayan history would be the only possible comparison.84 Yet, beyond 
painstaking details and microscopic use of archives, there is a vacuum of 
themes and questions in this last collection. Published from the late 1960s to 
the late 1970s, Barran and Nahum's seven volume study on Uruguayan rural 
development, Historia Rural del Uruguay Moderno, was followed by another 
seven volumes written during the 1980s, Batlle, los Estancierosy el Imperio 
Britanico, focusing on the political transformation undergone by the country 
in the Battle era. Historia Rural can be interpreted as a conscientious, 
extensive treatise on modernisation with a heavy emphasis on technological 
change. It is argued that the process of modernisation (or more accurately its 
absence) explained most of the economic and political rural life of Uruguay. 
Batlle, los Estancieros... is completely different. In a political economy 
fashion, the authors seek to understand the advent of reform during the early 
1900s and to explain the consolidation of liberal democracy. Their concern 
is with institutions of government, party development, state autonomy and 
coalition formation. This second set of volumes built upon the earlier seven. 
A central argument, however, is hard to find in Barran and Nahum's work. 
The authors address vital questions and generate a number of interesting 
claims, but they are never able to weave together a central set of structured 
propositions or testable hypotheses. In fact they make a point of not 
establishing a theoretically grounded approach; yet the major contribution of 
their work is that it is laden with key implicit theoretical questions that 
emerge in the narrative as they examine the historical record. In part, their 
work can be taken as a test for rational choice theory. From what I would call 
an 'implicit' rational choice perspective, in both collections they show that 
individuals responded rationally to market incentives.85 Whether they 
refrained from innovation or, quite often, opted for stagnation rather than 
risk their resources in pursuing growth, individuals always made the choice 
that they thought best satisfied their own material interest.86 Plenty of 
examples are taken from the behaviour of the ganadero class (cattle raisers) 
and other hacendados to show that low land exploitation or resistance to 
technological innovation (a major theme of historiography on Uruguay) were 
rational ways to cope with markets. From the point of view of hacendados, 
despite its negative long-term consequences for the country's economy as a 
whole, latifundia ranching was not an 'irrational' strategy to follow. 
Resistance to technological innovation responded to an underlying rationality; 
the backwardness and inefficiency that characterised rural enterprises 
corresponded, in reality, to a market structure that did not provide enough 
incentives for more entrepreneurial and risky behaviour. The preference for 
less productive activities such as money lending, for instance, was also a 
consequence of the same rational principle; at certain points, financial 
speculation produced more profits than any other enterprise.87 
In terms of explaining the political sphere, Barran and Nahum are 
confronted with a problem that political economy has often overlooked, i.e., 
the rationality that applied to economic behaviour did not always apply to 
political behaviour. The same estancieros who responded smartly to markets 
acted less rationally when they engaged in politics. Political actions were 
certainly inspired by self-interest in general, but Barran and Nahum found 
plenty of other evidence. The historical record showed that Blanco 
estancieros joined the party because of the magnet of the divir i (the cause); 
that both Colorado and Blanco elites believed that the rural masses followed 
their leaders through devotion and loyalty (particularly during the Artigas 
period; see below) and that caudillos still attracted followers on the basis of 
a system of incentives and rewards that did not really correspond to the 
overall notion of economic rationality. In a word, political behaviour was still 
characterised by the same characteristics that the 'classic' literature had 
emphasised; this puzzle is explored in detail below. 
Another somewhat unresolved problem in Barran and Nahum was that of 
external versus domestic variables with the relationship remaining obscure. 
On the one hand, from an unspoken dependency perspective, they stressed the 
enormous importance of international markets, foreign finance and 
diplomatic influence in the construction of the nation state.88 On the other, 
domestic developments seemed to overshadow external factors, even during 
years of intense integration in the world economy.89 Furthermore, their 
insistence on the pernicious effects of war on the rural economy to explain 
poor economic performance and (rational) indifference to markets placed 
strong emphasis on domestic factors.90 In short, there is no clear indication 
as to how these two sets of variables combine, or whether the preponderance 
of one over the other responds to different kinds of issues. A way in which 
this dilemma could be partially solved would be to argue that the influence 
of one or the other depended on different stages of development. The further 
back in time, the more domestic variables explained events, while the more 
the economy developed and engaged in trade, the more external factors 
played a role.91 On this point they would agree more, but not completely, 
with world system or dependency theories. I say 'not completely' because, 
as I understand it, such theories give plenty of indications that even after the 
full incorporation of the country into the global economic order the 
fundamental engine of political change was to be found in domestic factors. 
I agree, but then the insistence on international markets as the engine of 
change in Historia Rural and the urge to attribute to Britain a key role in the 
forging of the state in Batlle, los Estancieros should be more qualified.92 
Political institutions developed during periods in which domestic factors were 
predominant and these same institutions changed little when after the late 
1870s the country more intensively entered the so-called British Informal 
Empire. Of course, changes in the state bureaucracy did take place after that 
point to cope with the needs of new banking, communications and the export 
economy. Yet coalitions and party politics changed only slowly. I suggest 
that we must differentiate regional from international factors. I place regional 
developments within the category of domestic factors, while I reserve the 
term international for events that were directly connected to European 
diplomatic, military or financial influence. Finally, Barran and Nahum argue 
that the reforms of the early century can be explained by the relative 
autonomy gained by the Uruguayan state vis-a-vis economic elites.93 State 
autonomy gave Colorado reformers the leeway needed to consolidate 
democracy. As indicated, I agree with this line of argument; changes in the 
twentieth century came from within the state apparatus rather than from civil 
society. In Historia Rural, however, we find a somewhat different view. 
References to the control exercised by the ganaderos on the state abound.94 
They argued that during the 1880s the state left the ganaderos off the hook 
in terms of taxation; these interpretations are conflictive because Historia 
Rural argues for landowners' strong influence in the late nineteenth century 
while Batlle, los Estancieros suggests the opposite. If landowners did control 
the state by the late nineteenth century, then the Uruguayan state would look 
very much like its Argentine analogue where, by the early 1880s, 'economic 
power fused with political power' in the hands of the landowning elite.95 In 
contrast (discussed below), a major part of the development of the Uruguayan 
state is the history of its separation from the rural upper classes; definitely 
by the 1880s entrepreneurial landowners did not control the institutions of 
government. My reading is that the Uruguayan rural upper classes were able 
to influence economic policy, but they were not as effective in shaping public 
policy and political institutions. Both aspects of this influence must be 
differentiated. 
Another major contribution to the problem at hand has been the work of 
Lucia Sala de Touron and Rosa Alonso Eloy. From a Marxist standpoint, 
they have highlighted the impact of the international economy on class 
conflict.96 Their interpretation is based on a mode of production class 
analysis and a semi-orthodox version of the dependency approach. In their 
view, merchants engaged in commerce rather than landowners played the 
most important role in early periods of state formation.97 A greedy and 
wealthy class of urban merchants was able to render the state weak by making 
government dependent on private loans; their political visibility and urban 
bias exacerbated the rural-urban cleavage that wars had already strongly 
shaped. No sign of Barran and Nahum's autonomous state can be detected in 
this early stage that extended approximately until the end of the Guerra 
Grande; rather, the state depended on an urban commercial class that shaped 
economic policy.98 Finally, great emphasis in placed on the contradiction 
between pre-capitalist relations of production and the development of an 
'incipient' capitalism. The country emerged from this 'contradiction' 
generated by a pre-capitalist mode of production and a surfacing system of 
dependent development; it was the transition from the former to the latter that 
shaped the nation state.99 
My analysis coincides with their consideration of the importance of 
regional events to explain the characteristics of the polity.100 Diplomacy, 
political linkages and war with Argentina and Brazil created the original party 
cleavages and had enormous influence on the state. Their use of political 
economy is also refreshing for, among other reasons, unlike most recent 
work from this perspective, it is fused with excellent historical research. For 
example, in explaining the formation of the nation state, they stress that the 
free-trade/protection divide had no meaning here, and that economic policy 
is not invariably the result of group pressure. They demonstrate that mild 
protectionist laws passed by the state (which survived basically on revenues 
from customs duties) did not really express the interests of organised group 
pressure. Instead, it was growing competition with the port of Buenos Aires 
that shaped economic policy, especially taxes and customs duties.101 
I differ from their views in two very important points. First, unlike Sala 
de Touron and Alonso, I suggest that the Uruguayan political system was 
only timidly shaped by the world economy. Although their aim in this 
collection is not to explain the development of the polity in the whole 
nineteenth century, it is clear that they place an unwarranted (according to 
their own historical data) accent on the impact of foreign influence. For 
example, because they want to stress the negative leverage of alien powers 
in a trivial dependency fashion, they attempt a comparison with Mexico that 
I find pointless.102 Second, I argue that mode of production explanations are 
unacceptable to account for the creation of political institutions. Curiously 
enough, although they do attempt a comparison with Argentina under Juan 
Manuel de Rosas, they do not acknowledge that this very comparison 
challenges their mode of production and dependency approaches.103 In terms 
of their economies, factors of production, types of exports, linkages with the 
international market and pace of urbanisation, these countries were as 
identical as two cases can be. With slight variations, they shared very similar 
export economies and depended on the same markets (chiefly Britain). They 
borrowed from the same banks under similar terms, accepted the same kind 
of foreign investment, developed similar partnerships with foreign capital, 
and shared a similar geographical locale. In addition, these pastoral societies 
received similar strains of European immigration and developed a very 
similar social make-up. Politically and institutionally, however, both 
countries differed notably, and these dissimilarities remained substantial to 
this day. Needless to say, they present a serious challenge to dependency and 
world systems theories even in their latest, most sophisticated versions.104 
Differences between the two lay in different patterns of party formation that 
expressed different types of collective action on both shores of the River 
Plate. 
II. Parties, War and the Military 
During the first half of the nineteenth century every single event that had a 
bearing on the political system was regional. More than any influences 
emanating from the world economy, invasions from Brazil and Argentina 
shaped the political parties and moulded institutions of government.105 
Regional conflict and military activity deeply permeated the political life of 
the Banda, which, after all, had started off as a military outpost.106 In 1875, 
based on a large number of Consular Reports from Montevideo, the British 
Foreign Office described the country quite accurately as a 
'...State originally part of the Spanish Vice-royalty of Buenos 
Aires [that] became the object of a long and ruinous war between 
Brazil and the Argentine Confederation which only terminated in 
the year 1828 through the mediation of the British Government... 
the territory being constituted as independent... under a treaty 
signed between Brazil and the Argentine Confederation, the 
object of which was to make a sort of neutral ground of which 
had long been a battle field between the people of Spanish and 
Portuguese origin... the creation of an intermediate and 
independent State [was to] separate them as to prevent the chance 
of any future collision between them.'107 
Contemporaneous with the creation of the country were the cleavages that 
divided the polity into two bandos: the abrasilerados (pro-Brazilian factions) 
and the aportenados (pro-Buenos Aires factions). When direct invasions 
ceased, Brazil and Argentina still served as military and logistic bases for 
revolutionary forces that almost constantly tried to topple the government in 
Montevideo.108 By the end of the 1830s, when the issue of Independence 
had been settled, two identifiable organisations emerged, directly linked with 
these countries and gathered around two war heroes, Fructuoso Rivera (a 
founder-to-be of the Colorados) and Jose Antonio Lavalleja (Blanco). One 
'embraced the dogma of liberty...although this was, most of the times, a 
different name for anarchy'109 while the other, in a more legalistic fashion, 
wanted a government'a la espanola' with more centralisation and a stronger 
bureaucracy. Brazilian and Argentine influence on Uruguayan political 
organisations was lasting and resilient. Indeed, extreme versions attributed 
all the tribulations of the republic exclusively to these influences. In 1863 a 
contemporary wrote that 
'In agreement with the historical record it can be guaranteed that 
without the impulse and cooperation given by political groups of 
neighbouring countries to the revolutionary element of the Banda 
Oriental...peace would have never been disturbed nor blood have 
been shed or the industry of foreigners and Nationals obstructed 
from following its natural development.'110 
The resilient character of the party in the opposition was, thus, attributed 
to regional assistance. Both the Portuguese and the inhabitants of the original 
founding colonial capital, Buenos Aires, waged war against, and developed 
alliances with, Uruguayan political organisations in both the city and 
countryside. Tulio Halperin Donghi reminds us that the revolutionary junta 
in Buenos Aires held the domination of the Banda Oriental as a priority in its 
revolutionary agenda; the 'war in the East' became one of the most important 
fronts that the Junta must control to establish its supremacy in the region.111 
The same can be argued for Brazil, that regarded the possession of the Banda 
as vital for its domination of the region. Because the strip was geographically 
a 'buffer state' between the Portuguese and Spanish colonies, it became from 
the very beginning a territory in dispute. 
On the economic side, more than the structural limitations of an 
underdeveloped pastoral society, a permanent state of war explained the 
Banda's poor economic performance. While by mid-century, political 
processes in Argentina, as Oszlak tells us, were framed by 'profound changes 
in economic developments that generated growing expectations of material 
progress', in Uruguay the situation was exactly the opposite.112 Differences 
in size, political culture or the more entrepreneurial attitude of the landed 
elite in the Province of Buenos Aires were less relevant in explaining 
differences in the level of development than the Uruguayan wars of 
independence and conflicts that followed (1811-1814, and 1815-1820), the 
Brazilian invasions (1825-1828) and the Guerra Grande (1839-1851). The 
Banda had no abundance of resources, but it was not completely devoid of 
them either. Despite its small size, it had excellent pastures and a first-rate 
sea port. Tellingly, in the eighteenth century it emerged as a serious 
challenger to Buenos Aires. In 1778, when Montevideo opened to overseas 
trade, the monopoly established by Buenos Aires was promptly affected; by 
the 1790s merchants and entrepreneurs of all kinds in Argentina complained 
in large numbers about competition from Montevideo. The Banda's harbour 
was doing exceptionally well; among others, the Italian Consul in 
Montevideo wrote enthusiastically about the blessings of its port: 
'..the city...benefits from navigation and commerce., (and)..Its 
port is more secure and comfortable than that of Buenos 
Aires...'113 
If Buenos Aires felt threatened economically by the commercial activities 
of the port of Montevideo, the threat was short-lived. By the late 1820s 
Buenos Aires was already in a much better position than its sister city in 
attracting foreign trade. By that time, the Province of Buenos Aires started 
a period of economic expansion that was to establish it as the main partner of 
Britain in the leather, wool and beef trades during the later part of the 
century. In 1832, just two years after the approval of the first Uruguayan 
Constitution, Montevideo merchants estimated that almost 90 per cent of the 
ships and freighters entering the area had their final destination at Buenos 
Aires, as imported goods brought via Argentina into Uruguay doubled those 
that made the opposite journey. In terms of livestock production, a similar 
situation developed. Despite an encouraging performance in the early 1810s, 
the Banda already lagged behind Buenos Aires by the end of the Artigas 
Protectorate (early 1820s); the export economy was in a shambles and 
regional trade, upon which the country heavily depended, severely 
disrupted.114 In 1874, the Executive reported that from 1860 to 1874 alone 
public debt increased about thirty times as a consequence.115 This estimate 
did not include the major wars that preceded the 1860s. Barran and Nahum 
remind us that the Guerra Grande (1839-1851) set back livestock production 
to levels below those of the colonial period and that it marked a return to the 
technology and production habits of the colony.116 
In terms of state building, state revenue remained modest at best; lack of 
economic diversification and inefficient and erratic taxation resulted in 
narrow dependence on customs duties from the Port of Montevideo. By 1829, 
from a total state revenue of 751,040 pesos, customs duties provided the state 
with 582,234 pesos. By 1872 the state's income totalled 8,099,554 pesos, out 
of which 7,207,907 came from customs duties.117 So this was a city port 
whose revenue came almost exclusively from the use of its sea port rather 
than control of its hinterland. By the 1870s the executive was still unable to 
penetrate the countryside (it depended completely on the parties for 
communications and enforcement of ordinances) and the military, as a 
professional establishment that should respond to the executive, existed only 
on paper. State capacity, i.e. the administrative and coercive abilities of the 
state to implement its official goals, was minimal. A recognisable state 
structure did not consolidate until the 1870s and even then both the military 
and the state looked like a loose assortment of decentralised agencies, 
constantly suffering from lack of communication and a wretched budget that 
had a hard time carrying out the most elementary taxation.118 In contrast, 
under Juan Manuel de Rosas, Argentina had already experienced the 
unification of the military and the expansion of its state bureaucracy. Much 
more intensively than in Argentina, continuous involvement of the Orientales 
in armed struggle forged a solid tradition of citizen militia. Up until the 
1900s, war in the rural areas was perceived as a 'natural' feature of political 
life. 
Not surprisingly, contemporaries observed that 'rivalry between the parties 
and chronic civil wars', more than anything else, had been responsible for the 
weakness of the state and skyrocketing external debt.119 In 1870, the British 
charge d'affaires wrote 
'The consequence of this wretched state of the country is that the 
peons or labourers are taken from the estancias, the flock of the 
different proprietors mingle,...and what is worse the men who 
cultivate either their own bits of land, or labour for their 
employers on a larger scale in the tillage of the soil, are forced to 
join the military service of one or the other of the leaders or to 
seek refuge in the woods, and thus the cultivation of the land is 
abandoned...I believe my Lord that no political change could 
make the condition of this country worse than it now is, and 
which old inhabitants declare to be the more deplorable than it 
was in the nine years war ending in 1851.'120 
While the economy deteriorated, Colorado and Blanco armies consolidated 
clientelistic networks on a geographical basis; collaboration among bosses 
connected those networks nationally. In the eyes of contemporaries the 
confrontation between these two parties was of such cruelty and intensity that 
it became a distinguishing feature of the Banda. John Munro, the British 
charge d'affaires in Montevideo, depicted political confrontations between 
government forces and the opposition with horror. Writing to the Earl of 
Granville in January of 1871, his impression was that 
'In the battle of the 25th December both parties appeared to be 
imbued with a savage spirit of mutual hate, the rebel cavalry 
which commanded the engagement with their whole strength 
broke the infantry of the government force, and made a most 
inhuman slaughter, lancing the fugitives for leagues without 
mercy, and, by their own confession, running them through even 
when begging [for their lives]..Such extreme cruelty [stimulated] 
the spirit of revenge, and when subsequently the government 
troops obtained the advantage, their infantry also bayoneted 
[them] without scruple. I believe, for the mortality caused ...by 
the first cavalry charge of the rebels, that the government troops 
lost more men killed on this day that did the Blancos, but the 
former remained masters of the field...' 
He called attention to the social consequences of these party wars and, in 
particular, to undefined victories; no contender seemed really able to 
dominate the other: 
'...the Blancos dispersing and flying in groups and, as is 
customary on similar occasions, committing every sort of robbery 
and atrocity in their flight. As is usual in this country, the 
victory, if it can be so called, has not been followed up, and the 
Blanco forces have reformed, though at a considerable distance 
from Montevideo, with the declared intention of continuing the 
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His description coincides with similar accounts given by other members of 
the diplomatic body in Uruguay.122 In sum, the frequency of party 
insurrections was phenomenal and their intensity exceptional. In 1836 Rivera 
confronted Oribe and then the Guerra Grande dragged the country into 
turmoil until 1851; in 1863 the Colorado general Venancio Flores (with 
Brazilian support) revolted against the (Blanco) government of President 
Berro; in 1870 Timoteo Aparicio (Blanco) struggled against President 
Lorenzo Batlle (Colorado); in 1897 Aparicio Saravia (Blanco) fought against 
President Juan Lindolfo Cuestas (Colorado) and in 1904 the (last) revolution 
of Aparicio Saravia shook the (Colorado) government of Batlle y Ordonez. 
Highly mobilised, these parties created a political system in which 
participation was equated with armed struggle - thus the 'apathy' of citizens 
who, when the opportunity arose, disappointed the party doctors by not 
casting ballots as eagerly as expected. Widespread indifference to electoral 
politics caught the attention of observers, who could not understand the 
connection between highly mobilised parties and the reluctance of the rank 
and file to cast ballots.123 A foreign observer put his finger on the reason 
for such apathy when he complained: 
'It is difficult to account for this chronic state of revolution., 
[which has resulted in]., a sort of indifference on the part of the 
people, who allow themselves to be geared by a clique of 
ambitious men, the self elected representatives of the 
country.'124 
This coincided with the judgement of another observer who in August of 1864 
wrote that the reason for this indifference lay in the frequency of war, which 
had done so much damage to the Republic: 
'...the Oriental State has been at war since 1801 and amongst all 
its social classes has always existed mistrust and apathy [which 
extended] to the totality of business sectors as well...[in every 
single year] there has been a war in Uruguay of some sort or 
another. As a consequence of these wars and revolutions the 
Orientales and foreigners established in the Republic migrated to 
different countries, because not all of them wanted to serve in the 
war, nor did they share the same political creed; the years of 
peace were too short to restore their rights and heal them from 
the maltreatment that they had suffered'.125 
Obviously, apathy resulted from a system in which only revolutionary 
forces could guarantee representation. As in the rest of the Americas and 
most of Europe, voting was not only clientelistic but also meaningless 
because of the absence of guarantees that elected authorities vvould remain in 
office. In studying the Argentine regime of the 1880s, Hilda Sabato has also 
been puzzled by a similar 'apathy'; unlike Uruguay, however, apathy in 
Argentina defined more the behaviour of the upper classes, which suggests 
a crucial difference between these societies.126 My conclusion is that while 
in Uruguay (see Section IV below) elites harboured a mixture of fear and 
respect for the lower classes, in Argentina that fear was, if anything, much 
less pressing.127 In Argentina, the spectre of vertical alliances between 
contending elites and the lower classes, or general insurrection, was much 
less credible. 
In Uruguay, apathy was encouraged by consternation over the issue of the 
military draft; to serve in the party militia was neither voluntary nor 
especially financially rewarding. Both political parties and the army resorted 
to mandatory and frequent instances of conscription that drained the economy 
and created a stronger sense of insecurity and apprehension.128 Foreigners 
were at times forced to join up, Brazilians and Argentines being numerous 
among the militia of both parties and foot soldiers in the army. During the 
Venancio Flores rebellion in the mid-1860s Spaniards, Italians and some 
British citizens were seized and forced to serve in the Colorado-Brazilian 
army of Flores; even 'Greek citizens [were] ... forced into serving and 
carried to the barracks'.129 In a system in which no armed group could 
impose itself completely over the other and the state was too feeble to 
centralise power, negotiations in time became essential for survival. By the 
1870s the costs of war were so high that arbitration had become a routine 
practice, the two parties using intimidation and informal negotiation to avoid 
armed confrontation. At the time of the Timoteo Aparicio revolt an observer 
wrote: 
'As yet no collision of any importance has happened between the 
contending parties. Their mutual object, as usual in these civil 
wars, being apparently to avoid fighting and sending the usual 
bombastic reports to the head of their respective factions, the 
deplorable effect, however, of these lawless bands travelling over 
the country having already been experienced in robberies of 
horses and cattle...and increasing numbers of assassinations.' 
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By the 1870s agreements in terms of quotas or representation and 
territorial influence materialised. Compromises were imposed on the 
dominant party (mostly the Colorados) by forces in the opposition (mostly the 
Blancos) and marked different stages in the formation of the party system. 
Three of these wars, in particular, were crucial. A first revolutionary 
breakthrough was the wars of independence; these included the Jose Gervasio 
Artigas revolution (1811-1820) and subsequent conflicts. A second struggle 
that was decisive for party development was the Guerra Grande (1839-1851). 
The Flores insurrection of 1863 was also important, but it was the Revolution 
de las Lanzas (Revolution of the Spears, 1870-1872) that closed what I see 
as a crucial first period of polity formation that ended with the last 
revoluciones de partido.131 The Revolution de las Lanzas resulted in the so-
called Paz de Abril, which was followed by militarism and afterwards 
civilismo, relatively calmer periods that did not experience revoluciones de 
partido. 
The Artigas Revolution 
' . . . [his army was] ... a group of gauchos transformed into field 
marshals'132 
The 1811 revolution lead by Jose Gervasio Artigas represented a turning 
point that laid the foundations for a new polity. Although the term 
'revolution' reflects the terminology used by contemporaries, the struggle led 
by Artigas can be rightly called a revolution from the bottom up. It was an 
armed mass-based movement which challenged the state and set the basis of 
an alternative regime by substituting ruling elites and enforcing changes in 
terms of access to the means of production (land). For the rural masses the 
very foundation of the country rested upon this revolution that established 
La Patria Vieja, 1810-1820, or Protectorado, a federalist system that aspired 
to form a League of Provinces. It demanded open access to the ports which, 
up until then, had been controlled by the cities of Buenos Aires and 
Montevideo and defended by the military might of the Viceroyalty. It also 
demanded a deep re-structuring of the agrarian economy that could clearly 
be conceived as agrarian reform. Thus, unlike Argentina, in which the wars 
of independence were fought from the city to the countryside, in Uruguay the 
wars of independence were wars against the city. While Buenos Aires became 
the ideological and military locus of the revolution, Montevideo remained the 
stronghold of the counterrevolution. Moreover, while in Argentina 
enlightened urban minorities based in Buenos Aires took control of the 
independence movement, the struggle in Uruguay was led by the rural 
poor.133 These differences had great consequences for future political 
development because, while after the first instance of revolutionary euphoria 
in Argentina the revolutionary leadership became more moderate (Mariano 
Moreno is a good example), in Uruguay the revolutionary programme was 
carried out to a much greater extent. The Uruguayan rural masses differed 
markedly from the urban revolutionary elites of Buenos Aires on the issues 
of land redistribution and a more equitable allocation of the spoils of wars; 
while the former became much more radical in their claims, the latter took 
on a significantly more moderate stance. 
Colonial policies that created large numbers of 'free but miserable men' 
explain part of the rural-based revolutionary impulse of the Banda.134 On 
15 November 1781, the Alcalde of the Cabildo of Montevideo was concerned 
that 
'...the grandsons and sons of the original settlers do not possess 
an inch of land to cultivate or raise cattle...it cannot be conceived 
that the cause for this state of affairs is land scarcity; rather, it 
lies in a few hacendados who occupy more land than all the others 
put together., all in detriment of [our] industry and 
population.'135 
Intense demand for land marked the end of the colonial period and not 
surprisingly coloured the wars of independence. Land invasions and evictions 
became more and more frequent as the 1810s approached and, particularly 
in the southern part of the country, they triggered violence and discontent. 
Unlike other economies in which the existence of peasant or Indian villages 
with systems of share-cropping, rents or other type of dependent relations 
absorbed a great part of rural unemployment and inserted entire families in 
the rural economy, much evidence in the Banda points to high rural 
unemployment, unstable family life and no available land from the late part 
of the colonial period.136 In addition, a strong anti-city sentiment was 
widespread among the rural populations. High levels of absenteeism among 
the landed upper classes resulted in haciendas controlled from Montevideo; 
merchants invested in land and supervised their property from the city, for 
the most part remaining aloof from the countryside and adding to the 
resentment of landless labourers. 
It must be pointed out, however, that this state of affairs, although directly 
resulting from colonial policies, was not the product of a 'feudal' mentality 
on the part of the Crown. Rather than the by-product of a feudal-like 
economic policy, widespread support for latifundia ranching on the part of 
the colonial authorities resulted from fears of a Portuguese invasion through 
unpopulated borders. In a situation of scarce population and much less scarce 
loyalists, the large latifundio was thought to provide a mechanism for border 
control; simply, landowners were expected to defend their property 
militarily. If these measures that more and more alienated the rural poor 
contributed to the revolutionary character of the wars of independence, other 
aspects of colonial policy also encouraged the idea of badly needed economic 
reform and thereby added to revolutionary fervent. In Felix de Azara's well-
known Memoria sobre el est ado rural del Rio de la Plata one can find, as 
Barran and Nahum, Campal and Real de Azua have argued, a strong 
precedent for the economic reforms launched by Artigas in 1815.137 
Moreover, the sixth element of this fascinating Memoria proposes to grant 
property titles to those occupying tracts of land who did not have them; the 
document as a whole proposes a reorganisation of property, society and the 
distribution of wealth in the agrarian economy. Azara and others among the 
colonial authorities perceived the contradiction between the expansion of 
large latifundios and the needs of the Banda, but hoped that, after containing 
the Portuguese or establishing a stable alliance, attention could be turned to 
these burning issues. The wars of independence altered their plans and 
destroyed their hopes, for they provided a vehicle to channel the grievances 
of the rural poor. 
It was in this context that Artigas launched his attack against the 
governments constituted in both Montevideo and Buenos Aires. His 
Federation of Provinces (1813) conveyed alarming news both for 
revolutionary Buenos Aires and conservative Montevideo, because a system 
dominated by the peripheral provinces suddenly became a threatening 
reality.138 Economically, artiguismo granted access to land to the rural 
poor, created a group of middle-sized owners and tried to break the 
monopoly on both ports; politically, it pursued a very strong nationalism and 
wanted the expulsion of foreign powers from the region (Spain and Portugal). 
As the struggle for Independence unfolded (1811-1813) and the Artigas 
forces fought the Spanish and portefios, the rural poor became more 
prominent in the loose coalition that composed the armies of independence 
(1813-1815).139 Their active role triggered fear among some of the original 
caudillos that accompanied Artigas, large hacendados who in 1814 welcomed 
the porteno invasion and in 1817 the Portuguese encroachment. The 
movement had counted on the support of the old cuerpo de hacendados, an 
organisation of landowners created under the Viceroyalty that opposed the 
dominance of Spanish business in the city. In the early years of the struggle, 
they particularly supported Artigas's initiative to tax the urban sectors more 
heavily.140 But as the movement took a radical turn, the role played by the 
upper classes in the revolution lessened; Artigas himself complained of the 
scarce number of those drawn from the upper classes remaining among his 
troops.141 
In contrast, during the first siege of Montevideo in 1811 and the following 
so-called 'exodus of the Oriental people', popular support for the Artigas 
crusade was overwhelming. In a similar fashion to the Mexican revolution, 
in which entire populations migrated following their political leaders, the 
Uruguayan rural masses abandoned land, family and employment to follow 
Artigas and his lieutenants. All sources agreed with the leader himself who, 
in a letter to Gal van, wrote: 
'All the Banda Oriental follows me massively...some burning 
their houses and the furniture that they cannot carry with them, 
some on foot ... because they have worn out their horses ... old 
women and weak old men, innocent children...march [with me] 
in the midst of all imaginable deprivations'.142 
While his troops were at the siege of the city, news of an imminent 
Portuguese invasion helped Artigas in recruiting a following in his retreat 
northwards that, at times, turned out to be too much responsibility for him 
and his troops.143 Military support came from the northern Argentine 
provinces of his federation as well, and after years of struggle, on 26 
February 1815, artiguista militia finally gained control of Montevideo. 
Legislation passed at that time is telling as to what the inspiration of the new 
regime was. Land was going to be taken from 
those who left the motherland, bad Europeans, and worse 
Americans who without justification claimed property rights over 
their old possessions., [and given to] men who deserve this 
commendation all under the conditions that those who are the 
most humble be the most privileged. Consequently, free negroes, 
mixed-bloods of this class, indians and poor Creoles, all can be 
awarded haciendas so that with their work and goodness they will 
contribute to their own happiness and the greatness of the 
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My point here is that the conflict became more about the redistribution of 
land and wealth than about independence from Spain. One can argue that the 
endemic disorder that reigned in the Banda's countryside was aggravated 
considerably by the wars and that the result was more a civil strife with 
regional and domestic dimensions than war against a foreign power.145 All 
in all, Spain sent very little re-enforcement to the Banda and it was the 
confrontation between Artigas and the Directorio in Buenos Aires that won 
the day.146 A new sense of nationality emerged that was more connected 
with the right of the lower classes to participate politically and economically 
than with the substitution of the Spanish authorities by a local Creole elite. 
Most research on artiguismo points in a similar direction; it was no doubt a 
movement that fostered the interests of the lower classes and that placed the 
rural poor among those who stood to gain.147 
Artigas's confrontation with Buenos Aires and his final defeat at the hands 
of the Portuguese was perceived as the ruin of those 'who were the most 
humble' and the 'good orientales' and as the victory of foreign powers and 
urban doctors. Tensions that characterised the state after 1830 and the sharp 
rural/urban cleavage that distinguished Uruguayan political history have a 
strong precedent in the relationship established between artiguismo and the 
city. After all, Artigas's army of mixed-blood gauchos and small rural 
producers had confronted urban merchants, international traders and 
manufacturers engaged in the jerked beef industry. In terms of class 
formation artiguismo also left a legacy. Most prominent was the so-called 
minifundio ganadero, ranchers who engaged in livestock production on small 
extensions of land or sometimes with no land at all, who prospered under the 
Protectorado.148 Small farmers also mushroomed in the immediacies of 
Montevideo and some other cities, in turn somewhat changing the depiction 
of the country side as the province of large latifundia. After the defeat of the 
Federation, litigation seeking the recovery of the land grants bestowed under 
artiguismo flooded the courts. To be sure, after the fall of protectorado 
most of these lands were declared public; legal petitions to recover them 
extended well into the late 19th century. In fashion with well-known 
arguments of relative deprivation, one can argue that the collapse of 
artiguismo partially explains the readiness of the rural poor to follow other 
caudillos and to mobilise intensively afterwards. 
Tellingly, the end of La Cisplatina (the regime that followed artiguismo 
under Portuguese control) resulted from another insurrection headed by one 
of Artigas's lieutenants, Jose A. Lavalleja, who organised the so-called 1825 
Independence Crusade. This was the Cruzada de los 33 Orientales, organised 
by Uruguayan exiles in Buenos Aires and, as its name indicates, counting at 
first only 33 volunteers. After their secret arrival from Buenos Aires the 
leaders organised an armed resistance against the Portuguese and did succeed 
in linking rural and urban interests, sharply divided after artiguismo. The 
outcome was the independence of Uruguay in 1828 through British 
diplomacy.149 The 33 were also able to gain the support of middle-sized 
business groups disappointed with the Cisplatina regime together with sectors 
of the lower classes who mistrusted foreign domination. The 'crusade' was 
also favoured by the emergence of the newly formed Rivadavia 
Administration in Buenos Aires.150 Yet the urban-rural alliance behind the 
33 Orientales was fragile. Its success was linked to shared dissatisfaction 
with Portuguese discriminatory policies in terms of property and cattle 
grants, old cleavages resurfacing as the invading forces returned home.151 
A 'reactionary configuration', in Moore's terms, was not to gain control of 
the state and development objectives were to remain second to peace for those 
in government. 
The Guerra Grande and Revoluciones de Partido 
One more war pushed development objectives even further from the primary 
focus of political elites. The Guerra Grande (1839-1851) was largely a 
product of the expansionist ambitions of Argentina under Juan Manuel de 
Rosas and the resulting Brazil-Argentina conflict; it made the state even 
weaker and demolished the economy.152 A diminishing workforce and 
alarming destruction of resources were part of the legacy of this war. 
From the Departamento of Maldonado, Pedro Bustamante, at the time a 
young lawyer, wrote in 1853 that 
'Sky and grass is what awaits the traveller who wants to cross 
from Minas to Maldonado. In 16 leagues of terrain I have not 
been able to count more than 400 head of cattle and horses. There 
are estancia owners who live off rice and dry beef, and those who 
can afford to offer you an asado cannot be called poor.'153 
Newspapers abundantly reported on the appalling situation of the rural 
economy.154 The consensus is overwhelming: scarcity of labour, lack of 
resources, depopulation, diminishing herds. 
Incidents leading to the war started in October 1838, when Manuel Oribe 
(Blanco) was deposed by Fructuoso Rivera (Colorado). Rivera had developed 
a strong alliance with Brazil and, in fact, there is evidence that part of 
Rivera's army was on the payroll of the Brazilian government.155 Once in 
control of Montevideo, Rivera tried to lessen his strong ties with Brazil by 
breaking his alliance with the insurrectionists of Rio Grande (southern Brazil) 
while at the same time opening communication with Juan Manuel de Rosas 
in Argentina. This last move was unsuccessful and Rivera could not 
undermine the already consolidated alliance between Rosas and Oribe. By 
1839 a period of small battles and skirmishes started, in which Rivera, with 
French help, successfully confronted several insurrections on the part of 
Oribe's allies, the most notorious of all being ex-President Juan A. Lavalleja. 
Under the leadership of Lavalleja the supporters of Oribe, consolidating as 
the Blanco Party, confronted the government troops on several occasions and 
finally had to accept defeat.156 In Argentina, 1840-42 were years of 
insurrection and instability, severe confrontations between Buenos Aires and 
the Litoral Provinces being at the centre of attention. From Montevideo, 
Rivera openly embarked on a military campaign to support the insurrection 
and participated personally in the war. Ironically, he was now defeated by 
Oribe who, in command of Rosista forces, had been assigned to repress the 
uprising in the name of the central government. In 1843, Rivera and a 
handful of his officers, barely fleeing alive from the battlefield, sought refuge 
in Montevideo; at his heels were the Oribista forces who immediately started 
a siege of the city port. Oribe, with a force of 7,000 men, besieged the city 
from February 1843 to October 1851. Less than 4,000 men defended the city, 
among whom only 400 were Uruguayan born; indeed, according to the 
estimates of the United States and Brazilian Consulates, these last did not 
number more than 200 and 100 respectively.157 Montevideo became the 
focus of resistance against Rosas and the natural refuge of anti-Rosas exiles. 
Immigration to Argentina drained the country to an extent never known 
before.158 The Spanish Consul in Montevideo reported to the Secretary of 
State in Madrid that in view of imminent civil war in Uruguay 'emigration 
has augmented enormously, 15,000 persons having left the country in a very 
short period of time... ' . As a result of this prolonged siege, in the city 
' . . . the demoralisation prevailing amongst the larger portions of 
the inhabitants particularly the soldiery in consequence of the 
privations and hardships they have suffered (is so great) that it is 
impossible to foretell what might take place ... Great exertions 
have been made by the police authorities to preserve order and 
tranquillity ... bodies of new civilians have patrolled the streets 
from sunset to sunrise; in spite of all this care several 
assassinations have taken place, some in broad daylight ... the 
disaffection at times in the garrison has been unbearable.'159 
If this was the situation in Montevideo, in the countryside things were not 
much better for both peons and producers. While plunder and pillage by loose 
bands of gauchos was alarming enough, direct exorbitant 'official' taxes were 
imposed on merchants and landowners to finance the war effort. General 
Fructuoso Rivera, the foremost Colorado leader and founder of the Party, 
' . . . asked from traders in the Villa de Melo ... a forced loan of 
12,000 duros, which he reduced to 4,000 afterwards, and as the 
merchants refused to pay not only because all were foreigners and 
considered themselves exempt ...but also because they wanted to 
remain neutral...[the colorados] threatened that if they did not 
approve that sum of money ...they would be expelled from the 
country ...their property confiscated, and in 40 days they had to 
clear their houses, during which time they could not conduct 
business... Incredulously, refusing to give up their rights, 17 
Spanish merchants, one French and one Argentine were in fact 
taken outside the villa before General Rivera, who ordered that 
they be transported to Brazil without farewell from their 
families...riding horses that, out of compassion, their neighbours 
lent them.'160 
The war was one of waiting, for there were long lulls in which 'not a shot 
has been fired for about 384 days' - it was towards the end that armed 
combat resumed 'after almost two years'.161 Despite its low combat 
intensity, however, the conflict became extremely important for polity 
formation. The city became known as La Defensa while the anti-Montevideo 
and pro-Rosas forces controlled a nearby small port next to El Cerrito (the 
little mountain). El Cerrito sought to establish its own administration and port 
at El Buceo and they considered themselves as a separate state project. Not 
surprisingly, given Rosas's campaign against foreign commercial interests, 
namely his programme of Defensa Americana which preached the formation 
of a Latin American bloc against European penetration in the River Plate, all 
foreign powers involved in the conflict supported Montevideo and vigorously 
opposed El Cerrito. 
Despite its low intensity, the war deepened the widening gulf between the 
city and the hinterland and dismantled what remained of the central 
bureaucracy. It also strengthened the parties by reinforcing the urban/rural 
cleavage; because of the siege, it provided the Colorados with captured 
constituencies in Montevideo and left the Blancos free to dominate the rural 
areas. As indicated, constituencies in the city counted on large numbers of 
foreigners, some of whom did join the Colorados and became leading 
members of the Party, giving the organisation a rather cosmopolitan outlook. 
Not surprisingly, two political communities separated by the walls of the 
citadel (Colorados and Blancos) in time formed and started to develop 
different identities and ideologies that contributed much to party cohesion. 
Urbanites incorporated into a Colorado Party that adopted more liberal 
platforms and reinforced its apparatus, eschewing its original rural outlook, 
became part of the apex of party hierarchy. Colorados became identified as 
pro-European and modernisers, while the party of El Cerrito, led by Oribe, 
became the stronghold of national indigenous interests. In October of 1848, 
the longest lasting newspaper of El Cerrito, El Defensor de la Independencia 
Americana, claimed that the assault on Montevideo was justified as an attack 
on Europhiles and other anti-nationalists.162 It echoed the opinion of most 
within the forming Blanco party and a large number of the Uruguayan-born 
inhabitants of the city under siege. In short, the war consolidated the rift 
between the two opposing sub-regions; rather than a clear ideological split 
between conservatives and liberals, party formation was connected to the 
characteristics of the Guerra Grande which was transformed, at the end, into 
a revolution de partido. 
After the war the parties reached an accord. A 'ni vencedores, ni vencidos' 
(neither winners nor losers) formula allowed for power sharing in the 
national Legislative Assembly. The preconditions for a party system were 
thus in place. Parties and their constituencies were now distinct entities 
within a polity that they controlled completely. To the disappointment of a 
large sector of the economic elites, who sought to direct the state along a 
more purely economic path of development, the Guerra Grande had 
strengthened the parties and increased the political leverage of caudillos. 
Merchants, manufacturers and landowners were of course part of the ruling 
coalition, but they continued nevertheless to mouth the refrain that the parties 
were the chief obstacle to development. In time the Assembly would become 
dominated by either one or the other party and presidents who tried to bypass 
the parties found it impossible to govern. The first president after the war, 
Juan Giro, tried (unsuccessfully) to discourage party rivalry by appointing an 
equal number of representatives from La Defensa and El Cerrito to the 
Assembly. His successor, Gabriel Pereira, found staunch opposition to his 
attempt to create a Partido Nacional that would encompass Blancos and 
Colorados. And President Bernardo Berro (1859-1863) had to yield to the 
parties as well; his attempts at minimising their influence ended by producing 
the Colorado Venancio Flores's insurrection. A very important consequence 
of the Guerra Grande was that the professional army became more partisan. 
Rank-and-file soldiers who identified with either party adopted the 
appropriate banners of their commitments {La Defensa or El Cerrito) and 
party control over the professional military increased. This particularly 
applied to the Colorados. By the end of the war the government claimed that 
'the situation in the country is hopeful, pacification is complete, 
and this peace will be long lasting... atrocities committed in the 
past will not be repeated'.163 
Yet the situation was far from stable. In the early 1860s the state was to be 
shaken by war again. 
In terms of regime changes this decade was remarkable. It witnessed the 
consolidation of Colorado Party rule with the triumph of Venancio Flores's 
revolt in 1865. Flores deposed Anastasio Aguirre, an interim president who 
had publicly identified himself with the Blanco Party; it would take another 
94 years for the Blancos to regain the Presidency. The political system looked 
more and more like a dominant one party system, with a party in opposition 
that, more often than not, refused to participate in national elections. This is 
not surprising. Once in government, the dominant party did its best to 
undermine the organisational capacity of its counterpart and denied the ousted 
party significant appointments in ministries or Congress; war remained the 
most reliable way to challenge authority and to obtain participation in the 
ruling coalition. Tellingly, after the Flores takeover, the Blancos immediately 
campaigned against the illegal Colorado government and attempted to revolt, 
hence the frustrated Bernardo Berro uprising. This was promptly followed by 
other insurrections in the name of the motherland and against foreign 
manipulation as incarnated in the Colorados. Also in this decade the country 
participated in the Paraguayan War (1865-1870), which provoked radical 
changes in the military establishment. 
The Flores Administration developed a highly controversial and 
clientelistic regime. Army revolts succeeded one another and even his own 
son, Colonel Fortunato Flores, accused of several crimes and according to 
contemporaries4 a person of detestable character', plotted successfully against 
the General and followed him as dictator.164 In 1868 the revolt led by 
Fortunato, also a declared Colorado, is indicative of the close relation 
between the troops stationed in Montevideo and the party. Fortunato headed 
about 500 professional troops, i.e. almost the entirety of the rank and file 
stationed at Montevideo (the 'Libertad' Battalion) and its surroundings.165 
His father, meanwhile, counted on the support of high military officers and 
mobilised most of the rest of the army countrywide (about 600 to 700 men, 
according to different sources).166 By contrast, the Blancos operated more 
on the basis of voluntary rural militia, although they also counted on the 
support of a few professional military. Tellingly, two years later in 1870, 
during another Blanco-led 'revolution' organised in Buenos Aires, the troops 
under the command of Blanco caudillos seem to have been a mixture of 
patriots and mercenaries, among whom men of Italian nationality were a 
majority. On 10 September 1870, describing the victory of the Colorado 
government over the Blancos in the periphery of Montevideo, the Italian 
charge d'affaires wrote 
'The troops recruited by Blanco leaders were by and large 
mercenary troops ... composed mainly of Italians ... Among the 
leaders that negotiated the settlement were two Italians, Bertelli 
and Ballotta, who, after the revolution failed, dared to ask 
protection from the Italian Legation.'167 
Fortunato Flores was forced out of office by the counterrevolution led by 
his father, who condemned his son and wife to prison.168 A newly appointed 
British charge d'affaires at Montevideo wrote that 
'although for some years [I] had been accustomed in the Spanish 
Republics of America, North and South, to see governments in 
power one more worthless than the other, never had I witnessed 
anything presuming to call itself a government more thoroughly 
despicable and more universally despised than the one imposed 
upon this country by ... Brigadier General Don Venancio Flores. 
The entire art of government as carried on by this pernicious 
gaucho, consists in putting his adherents into every post from 
which they may extract money, and his system has been carried 
out so unblushingly, that even in spite of the general indifference 
here to which I have so frequently alluded ... I cannot but think 
that the most callous will ... insist ... [that] things [must] be put 
to an end'.169 
Venancio Flores's return to office, however, cannot be interpreted as the 
establishment of a military government. In fact, a major cause of Fortunate's 
uprising had been his father's decision to leave office in the hands of party 
authorities in 1868. Venancio's partisan commitment to the Colorados and 
civilian rule was not enough to hold a firm coalition together behind his 
government. A major problem was the long lasting alliance of the General 
with Brazil. Forecasting some of the increasing unpopularity that the General 
was soon to bear during his contentious short administration, on his first 
entrance to the city as the country's fourth President in 1865, clear signs of 
popular dissatisfaction with Flores' alliance with Brazil surfaced. These only 
increased when Brazilian troops were permanently stationed in Montevideo 
after Fortunato's failed uprising. The government's connection with Brazil 
stirred deep-rooted nationalist feelings from the time of the 33 Orientales 
crusade and reinforced old cleavages between the parties. When Brazilians 
were in fact appointed to some important posts in the Flores administration, 
this diminished the government's prestige even more since they 4 ...(devoted 
themselves to) ... plunder and public robbery, a development that was 
formerly unknown'.170 
The unpopularity of these measurements was shared by the foreign 
community. Spanish, Italian, Russian, French and British charges d'affaires 
even considered asking their countries to break relations with Uruguay on 
account of abuses at the hands of Brazilians and others in the Flores 
administration, arguing that they had been unable to obtain justice in a single 
instance where murder had been committed.171 In addition to these 
problems internal to the state bureaucracy, the war effort against Paraguay 
made the army more daring and the atmosphere was one of imminent military 
takeover. The alliance behind Flores never really consolidated and even his 
own followers were growing increasingly critical of his rule. Flores was 
more than aware of the instability of his government and on 15 February 
1868 he left the government in the hands of Pedro Varela, President of the 
Senate; by March the country was expected to elect a new President for the 
period 1868-1872. Only four days after leaving office Flores was 
assassinated.172 In 1870 the legacy of the Flores administration and his 
tragic death were described in the following way: 
'There are in the Uruguayan Republic some fifty individuals, 
military men and lawyers, who look upon their private interests 
as those of the people. This knob of men is divided into three 
parties - the Floristas, partisans of General Flores, the 
Conservatives, and the Blancos. The Blancos cannot forgive the 
Floristas for having upset the regular Government through the 
assistance of the Brazilians. The Floristas cannot forgive the 
Blancos for the assassination of the Director-General Flores. The 
Conservatives, who are likewise accused of having participated 
in the assassination of Flores,. . . being more numerous, are better 
able to oppose the other two parties.'173 
Divisions within the parties upon the fall of the Flores government and his 
assassination were not deep enough to halt a tendency towards one party 
predominance, and the political system that followed retained the strong 
dominant one party system features of its predecessor. It was dominated by 
Colorado doctors who, unlike some of Flores's partisan correligionarios, had 
opposed too close an alliance with Brazil and had resisted the candombero 
tendencies of Flores. Yet this was a highly unstable system. Several small 
Blanco revolts took place, to which one should add others led by dissident 
Colorados. Colonel Maximo Perez, for instance, headed some disturbances 
adding to a chaotic situation that would come to a head during the serious 
Blanco uprising of Timoteo Aparicio a few years later. Described as a 'petty 
military local chief ... joined by about 300 gauchos and vagabonds', in 1870 
Perez declared himself the leader of a revolutionary movement. In the eyes 
of foreigners he seems to have been 'a man of notoriously violent and crude 
intents' who in 1868 had 'raised a force and marched upon the capital and 
whose submission was purchased by the government of the period'.174 
A serious challenge to the convulsive five years of Colorado control, 
equated with the power of 'doctores de la capital' came from the Blancos 
when Aparicio's insurrection triggered another revolution de partido and in 
the end forced the Colorados to negotiate quotas of participation in the Paz 
de Abril. This was the so-called Revolution de las Lanzas (1870-1872). The 
Italian charge d'affaires reported the stalemate between the two parties as one 
in which neither government troops nor Blancos could make any significant 
headway into the enemy: 
' . . . hundreds of people died on both sides, among whom were 
large numbers of Spaniards and Italians but ... [after a while] 
things come back to be exactly as they were before ... [namely] 
the Blancos are not able to take the city over and the Colorados 
are not able to push the Blancos away from the city limits. Some 
people within the citadel were arrested because of their support 
for the Blanco revolution ... and it is impossible to know how 
long this situation will last.'175 
Within the parties this revolution decreased the gap between doctors and 
caudillos (this was particularly true of the Colorados), and between the 
parties it forced cooperation. Aparicio challenged the government of Lorenzo 
Batlle who was the representative of the already firm alliance between the 
Colorados and the professional army.176 Calling for greater participation in 
the government, Blanco insurgents took up arms. After two years of struggle 
the two parties verbally agreed that the Blancos were to be given control of 
four out of twelve departamentos. By this agreement, they obviously 
sanctioned electoral fraud and divided the parties regionally, as the results of 
elections in Blanco or Colorado controlled departamentos were highly 
predictable.177 Yet the pact favoured state growth and facilitated 
government penetration of the rural areas. A major consequence of the revolt 
was that it eroded Colorado hegemony; the possibility of a one party system 
with military backing was now out of the question. 
The rudimentary system of co-participation that emerged was 
reconstructed several times up until the 1900s, but its basic structure 
remained the same. The Revolution de las Lanzas also triggered changes in 
party organisation and composition particularly in the Blanco Party. So far, 
the Party had operated on the basis of rural insurrections, but after 1872 it 
made a conscious effort to reinforce its civilian urban wing and to work on 
party doctrine and discourse.178 Blanco caudillos found receptive ears 
among principista doctors who defended the right of political minorities to 
representation, sought to transform the Blanco Party into a partido de ideas, 
and feared the authoritarian characteristics of Colorado hegemony. After the 
Paz de Abril the linkages between caudillos and doctors in both parties 
strengthened.179 It came at the time in which Liberalism was at its peak; this 
was the epoch of the camaras bizantinas and the most incendiary speeches in 
Congress. Yet Liberalism consolidated upon the structure of a party system 
run by caudillos and intense collective action involving the 'traditional' part 
of society. It had been the legacy of the wars of independence and the 
revoluciones de partidos that transformed backward Uruguay into a fertile 
soil for liberal democracy which, corrupt as it was, nevertheless provided the 
institutional backbone for the daring reforms of the early twentieth century. 
In 1886, the influence of the principistas in both parties had grown strong 
enough to contribute to the final divorce of the professional military from the 
parties. 
III. Civilian Rule and the Military 
Because of lack of data and the obsession in the previous literature with the 
economy and the parties, there has been no treatment of the evolution of the 
military and its relationship to both the state and the parties. This is 
paradoxical because, after all, until the turning point of the late 1880s, the 
Uruguayan executive was mostly run by caudillos who were military men as 
well. In a country permanently at war, government was composed of an 
unstable mix of military men and civilians. In such a situation there was no 
guarantee that civilian political elites would prevail. Yet constitutional 
provisions prohibiting active professional military men from serving in the 
Congress or campaigning for office were slowly but surely enforced. Why 
did political parties and civilian rule eventually prevail? 
From the 1830s to the late 1880s generals and colonels were active in 
politics, but it is difficult to differentiate between the partisan militant and the 
professional military. Since independence the Blancos had counted officers 
among their ranks as well, and after the same war military men garrisoned 
at El Cerrito remained tied to the Blancos and to the countryside. After 
independence both Colorado and Blanco military caudillos recruited their 
forces in the rural areas, where they made their reputation as political 
leaders. As late as the 1870s the military's ties with the countryside remained 
strong.180 But from the October Peace of 1851 to the April Peace of 1872, 
to a great extent the professional military became Colorados. During the 
Guerra Grande the military headquarters located in Montevideo and the 
Colorado party leadership developed an intimate connection that transformed 
large numbers of officers into Colorado party members. Because during the 
so-called War of the Triple Alliance or Paraguayan War (1865-1870) the 
professionalisation of the military took place under Colorado governments, 
most high-ranking Generals took part in the Colorado cause. In the early 
1870s the struggle against the Blanco revolt of Timoteo Aparicio was 
accelerated, professionalising the army even further. It can be argued that 
both of these wars were fought by an army of Colorado officers defending 
Colorado governments. Therefore, when the Colorados put forward the 
important democratic reforms of the 1880s and 1900s, they found only 
moderate resistance on the part of the army. The military-Colorado alliance 
that under party control had promoted army growth and professionalisation 
had also set specific limits on the role played by military men in Congress. 
Most presidents turned out to be ex-generals who kept in close contact with 
the barracks, but who also consulted openly with party caudillos and doctors. 
Since the late 1830s generals and military heroes publicly expressed their 
party affiliation.181 In the 1860s the veteran Venancio Flores ruled in the 
name of the caudillo, candombero wing of the Colorado party. But under his 
rule alliances between military men and doctors became even more frequent; 
in the 1870s the Club Liberal, founded by doctors who represented one of 
three major Colorado factions, counted great numbers of officers as active 
members.182 No doubt after the War of the Triple Alliance the military 
became more aggressive politically. The Lorenzo Latorre administration 
(1876-1880), however, was the only example of a military government that 
attempted to rule without the parties (see below). The two military 
governments that followed developed close ties with them. The first was the 
Maximo Santos administration (1882-1886) and the second the regime run by 
his ex-Minister, General Maximo Tajes, who was President until 1890. Both 
presidents developed close alliances with doctors. Santos found support in 
Colorado principistas and Tajes developed an even closer relation with them, 
in particular with Julio Herrera y Obes, the leader of the movement called 
Civilismo, who finally replaced Tajes in office. The coalition behind 
President Herrera y Obes succeeded in rendering powerless the pro-Santos 
military-civilian alliance and was able to carry out the transition towards a 
regime in which officers and civilians, the latter dominating the state, mixed 
less in public posts. 
Overall, it was in the intermeshing of parties and the military, in the 
shared loyalties of generals and officers who were simultaneously military 
men and partisans, that the polity evolved into a liberal democracy. To a 
large extent this explains why it took so long for the military to emerge as a 
force divorced from party politics. As it can be seen in the chronological list 
of presidencies (see Appendix), generals and civilians shared the presidency, 
but they did so in the name of the Colorados or Blancos. Why the parties kept 
together in a situation in which class cleavages were weak and ideological 
differentiation thin, finds an explanation in these cross alliances and in 
loyalties developed in times of war. Military organising filtered into the 
parties through the parties' networks in the military and provided a 
significant part of their organisational backbone. In their origins, the two 
major parties had not been so much a product of the legislature as a result of 
the influence of major military figures. The two parties were also united by 
the role they played in the defence of the country in the wars of independence 
and in the immediate aftermath; after all, unlike Argentina, in Uruguay 
parties fought these struggles while the professional military played a 
subordinate role. 
The Lorenzo Latorre administration deserves special attention.183 Latorre 
was the foremost state-builder of the nineteenth century and his government 
stood alone as the only coalition which successfully attempted to govern 
without the parties. The equation seemed simple enough: the parties had to 
become weaker for the state to grow stronger. Economic elites vigorously 
supported his regime since for a long time they had perceived party rule as 
inimical to prosperity. In a country ruled by alliances of general partisans and 
doctors, by the 1870s business groups still had trouble penetrating 
government. In the aftermath of the Paraguayan War, military men felt 
uncomfortable under party control and resented a system of promotions that 
rewarded party loyalties and benefited the old heroes of revoluciones de 
partido more than distinguished officers. Economic elites found these 
military men to be natural allies, particularly among the corps stationed at 
Montevideo. By the mid-1870s this coalition consolidated. From 1876 to 
1880 President Lorenzo Latorre represented urban business, part of the 
military and entrepreneurial estancieros who wanted centralisation of 
authority, modernisation and state growth.184 He had participated in the 
Paraguayan War and had begun his military career under the command of 
Venancio Flores. Having built a reputation in the army as valiant and 
brilliant, in 1875 he became Minister of War under President Varela. His 
ascent to power, as described by a notable and outstanding member of the 
ganadero elite, is quite telling as to who supported the government: 
'The people of Montevideo gathered yesterday in a General 
Assembly called by both national and international commerce, 
and acclaimed as Provisional Government the ex-Minister of War 
and Marine Colonel Lorenzo Latorre. Responding to the call of 
his fellow citizens, he has accepted such a demanding 
appointment until the first of March of 1877.'185 
The 'call' came from a paralysed and stagnant country. Under the 
hegemony of Great Britain and the ascendancy of the United States, a 
changing market environment had triggered serious processes of 
modernisation in Argentina and Chile which had touched Uruguay only 
slightly. During the Pedro Varela presidency (1985-86) the country had faced 
one of the most critical economic depressions in years and widespread 
discontent marked the mid-1870s. John Munro expressed clearly his opinion 
as to the roots of these problems: 
'It is not difficult..to find reasons for the state of prostration of 
this unfortunate country. The principal causes I believe to have 
been the lavish waste of public money immediately succeeding a 
four year civil war on the advent of General Flores to power, the 
...licence afforded to bankruptcy and every sort of speculations 
upon fictitious capital, producing a monetary crisis which has 
lasted for three years and the complete neglect and oblivion of 
every interest in the interior of the Republic [which only adds to] 
the great fall in the price of wool and hides..'186 
Latorre's reputation as both an honest military officer and a leader able to 
provide a strong hand was appealing to many belonging both to the lower and 
higher classes. For the first time in the history of the country the army 
seemed to have grown professional enough to administer the affairs of 
government and for the first time a strong institutional force able to establish 
order and progress materialised as a real possibility. 
The regime behind General Latorre was, compared to previous ones, quite 
homogeneous; it was supported by entrepreneurial self-made men, such as 
the Colonel himself, who despised 'traditional society' and professional 
politicians of illustrious origins such as the principistas. They, as Barran and 
Nahum have suggested, were pragmatic men inspired by a strong work 
ethic.187 Latorre sought to substitute the rule of both parties of caudillos and 
partidos de ideas by a state ruled by pressure groups. Radical as it was in its 
agenda of reform, the military regime of Latorre set the parameters for a type 
of military rule that still depended heavily on civilian partisans. The classical 
interpretation of the Latorre period as a time in which parties did not 
participate in government is only half true; if formally they did not as parties, 
informally their members cooperated with the regime in more than one way. 
Long before his ascent to power, the General had been perceived as a 
moderniser by the principistas who, during his administration, shared his 
enthusiasm for change and renovation. Not only political liberalism, but also 
economic modernisation were part of the renovation agenda of principistas, 
a heterogeneous group among whose members were those who perceived in 
Latorre a step forward on the path of political renovation. Once the task of 
state building was completed and the institutional framework settled for 
parliamentary democracy, the country could go back to party competition on 
a fair basis. For many, this heavily depended on modernising the economy 
and establishing order, two things that Latorre had promised to do. From the 
times in which they designed the 1830 Constitution, the principista doctors 
had struggled to differentiate themselves from the candomberos and regarded 
the dismal progress of the country as a direct consequence of poor efforts 
towards modernisation. Among their projects, it should be remembered, were 
to colonise the 'campana' with British immigrants and to pursue all possible 
measures to eliminate the gaucho.m 
At the other extreme of the political spectrum, traditional Blancos also felt 
attracted by the caudillo-like personality of the General. Reyes Abadie, 
quoting 4memorias' of contemporaries, reminds us that at the onset of the 
disastrous Pedro Varela government Latorre and the legendary Blanco leader 
Timoteo Aparicio developed a personal relationship that opened some lines 
of communication between the Blancos, representatives of the old Uruguay 
of gaucho caudillos, and the newer generation of professional military 
officers, sons of Spanish immigrants.189 And, as far as the Colorados were 
concerned, Latorre was still regarded as a partisan Colorado officer. Not that 
the General did not make it clear that partisan rule was out of the question. 
In his first speech at the time of assuming office in 1876, he put it very 
clearly: 
'My personal opinions are well-known, yet as much as I am 
honoured to have been a Colorado and (as such) have taken an 
active part in the battles that have tinted with blood the republic, 
I am as well honoured to declare that my government will forsake 
all prior disagreements and political partisanship. As a partisan, 
I do not want to inaugurate in my country anything except the 
great party of public morality, of administrative honesty, of 
freedom within order, of respect for the law and all other rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution.'190 
All in all, his government did accomplish much in this direction. But to 
govern required the expertise and collaboration of the political elite, and 
Latorre was wise enough to try to retain the loyalty of key party leaders. 
Public officials in his administration were never replaced by military men in 
ministries and key governmental posts; Latorre even kept some party politics 
alive by appointing a consultative committee of Blancos and (in larger 
numbers) Colorados. One can argue that he took power not to force upon the 
country a government run by the military, but in order to impose order and 
transfer the executive branch back to civilians afterwards. 
Real de Azua has pointed out - rightly, in my opinion - that this first 
military regime the country ever had was neither praetorian nor completely 
authoritarian. Bloodshed and violence (mostly in the countryside) were 
minimal considering the characteristics of the regime and its agenda.191 It 
must be added that abuses of individual rights were taken seriously and 
violence decreased despite some misuse of authority and the violation of 
citizenship rights that usually goes together with the process of centralisation 
of power. From the reading of most consular reports issued by different 
legations one can conclude that the diplomatic body as a whole praised 
Latorre's administration and saw it as a serious attempt to impose law and 
secure the property rights of foreigners. Influenced by the Colorado populist, 
candombero tradition, but more than anything as product of his own 
initiative, Latorre instituted an important reform affecting one of the most (if 
not the most) important vehicle of social mobility in the country, the army. 
Traditionally, forced recruitment and the draft had most affected blacks and 
those of mixed blood. During the first year of his government Latorre 
abolished this measure as a regular practice and publicly declared that 
'It is a matter of honour for my government to abolish this 
abusive procedure that until the present has condemned citizens 
of colour to an imposition that not only contradicts the 
Fundamental Law of the State that demands equal rights for all, 
but also the democratic principles to which we adhere.'192 
Above all else, economic elites (and the population at large) wanted order, 
peace and stability. Despite some turmoil, the modernising dictator provided 
that and more. Latorre promoted educational reform, balanced the state 
budget, monopolised the mechanisms of coercion, enlarged the state 
bureaucracy in order to provide services and carry out public works, and 
greatly improved the transportation system (the railway system in particular). 
Educational reform was one of the most impressive accomplishments of the 
regime. In 1877 Latorre appointed Jose Pedro Varela, the foremost 
Uruguayan educational reformer, as Director de Instruction Publica. Varela, 
a well-known liberal of positivist inspiration, had written a bold programme 
of educational reform {La education del pueblo, 1874) and in 1877 took 
before Latorre his project 'Law of common education', which was part of his 
new, acclaimed book La Legislation Escolar. Varela insisted that the country 
needed a democratic, free and secular educational system because 'ignorant 
people can only have governments that are in direct relation to their 
ignorance'. By 1876 in his 'Legislation Escolar, he forcefully argued that 
'In 45 years we have had 19 revolutions. War is the normal state 
of the republic. Not even 10 books have been published since 
independence. We do not know anything about me country, its 
population, or anything else...In the republic, no more than 
18,000 to 20,000 children can acquire an education while about 
60,000 to 80,000 remain in ignorance... The wisdom and 
efficiency of an educational system lies in successfully 
coordinating state policy with the freedom of the individual. The 
absolute control of the state over the educational system 
is...satisfactory, but contradicts the democratic idea. The mixed 
system that exists in the United States is more appropriate.' (pp. 
40-52) 
The quote is important, among other things, because it defines a lasting 
linkage between the state and public instruction in Uruguay. It was during the 
Latorre period that the state became the most important engine of public 
education, displacing the Church as an alternative source of learning. In fact, 
already by the early twentieth century most secondary education and the 
totality of higher education were in the hands of the state. The state 
bureaucracy under the Ministry of Public Instruction increased substantially 
during the next years and by the time that the reformist state of Jose Batlle y 
Ordonez made literacy a priority in the government's agenda, the state was 
already perceived as the patron of public education. 
On the economic side, in order to secure property rights in the countryside 
and encourage livestock production, a vigorous policy of enclosures was set 
in motion. While by 1877 the total amount of wire used in these enclosures 
amounted to 6,646 kilos, by the end of Latorre's administration in 1880 the 
total kilograms of wire used annually had jumped to 14,127.193 Latorre was 
also responsible for enormous improvements in the telegraph and mail 
systems and a number of important reforms such as restructuring the Rural 
Code and the expansion of the scope and power of the Supreme Court of 
Justice, particularly in the rural areas.194 If up until this point the state had 
not been able to pursue a coherent development strategy and had reacted 
slowly to market incentives or pressure from business, all this changed under 
the government of the 'Dictator'. Substantial efforts were made to increase 
efficiency and productivity in the export economy and in commercial sectors 
which translated into clear protectionist policies for the most modern sectors 
of livestock production. In terms of international trade, the regime reduced 
the external debt considerably and encouraged foreign investment. 
Commercial relations with Britain, after being suspended since 1871, were 
reestablished.195 The state budget was finally balanced and during the 
General's mandate it tilted to the advantage of the country. Montevideo 
merchants benefited greatly, particularly the wealthiest members of that 
community.196 Likewise, the Asociacion Rural received a number of 
valuable benefits: order in the countryside, the Reglamento de Polidas which 
augmented the police force in the rural areas, a reformation in the Rural Code 
that called for the state to enforce property rights, and a stronger voice in 
policy-making. Even the common citizen gained from the orderly peace 
imposed by the Dictator - in fact, the regime acquired such a degree of 
popularity among the population of Montevideo that when Latorre established 
a timetable for the resumption of civilian rule he was asked to stay in 
power.197 
The army, however, benefited less. Paradoxically, while as a result of the 
Paraguayan War (1865-70), the Revolution de las Lanzas (1870-1872) and 
the so-called Revolution Tricolor (1875) the army had increased its numbers, 
after 1876 and under a military regime men in active duty were dismissed and 
entire battalions eliminated. As part of its budgetary policies, the state 
drastically reduced the number of active soldiers and officers; this explains, 
to a great extent, Latorre's success in balancing the state budget. In March 
1876 the officer corps numbered 1,205 men (including 3 Brigadier Generals, 
16 Generals, 177 Lieutenants and 25 Marines). By the end of his government 
only 153 officers remained and from a total of eight active battalions at the 
time of Latorre's accession to power, there were only four when Latorre 
stepped down from office.198 Clearly the most daring and strongest military 
government that the country had in the nineteenth century, it was also a 
coalition that managed to weaken the very instrument that had made its 
accession to power possible. Fear of more radical forms of military rule, in 
which business influence could have been ostracised, was another element 
that conspired against stronger military rule, not to mention fears that a more 
permanent military regime would have entailed a more expensive military 
apparatus. However, the most important factor that precluded the rise of a 
stronger military regime was party activity in and out of the barracks. 
Not that Latorre had opposed the re-establishment of civilian rule or latent 
party activity. By 1879 the Dictator was ready to leave office. A strong 
believer in republican institutions and considering his government only 
provisional, he resigned to the General Assembly barely four years after 
accepting his mandate. In addition to his belief in republican rule, he also felt 
pressure on the political front, where parties were pushing for a return to 
electoral rule. Many were disappointed at his resignation. The Asociacion 
Rural lamented the end of the Latorre period and so did the merchant elite of 
Montevideo. Popular demonstrations of support for his rule did not go 
unnoticed and his departure was followed by fear of chaos and a revolution 
de partido. After a brief transitional period his reputation certainly 
contributed to create consensus around the nomination of his comrade in 
arms, Maximo Santos, as President of the Republic; in the following years, 
military men shared in power with civilians during the administrations of 
Santos and Maximo Tajes. They ruled, however, under the tutelage of the 
Colorado party. 
During the period of so-called militarismo, namely, the Latorre 
administration and the two subsequent regimes, the parties - while being 
muted - were not dismantled. A major reason was the state's modest degree 
of penetration of society. Because there were not very many professional 
military men who could perform government functions adequately, and 
because the diplomatic body was composed of professional doctors, the 
government needed civilian politicians. On the economic front, the state also 
used parties to run the most basic functions of state maintenance. Taxation, 
for instance, remained a problem that presented both technical and political 
difficulties. Simple structural factors, such as the dominance of livestock 
production, had long constituted an obstacle to efficient collection. Because 
to tax movable goods such as cattle or sheep is always difficult, governments 
had customarily relied on the complicity of cattleowners, which meant that 
taxation remained based on political loyalties. Needless to say, Colorado 
governments tended to be more aggressive vis-a-vis Blanco ranchers and 
traders, while Blanco governments operated in a similar fashion vis-a-vis 
Colorado businessmen and landowners when they were in power. 
Urban trade turned out to be difficult to tax as well. Again, inadequate 
taxation was due not only to the fluid character of trade, but also to party 
politics. A large part of the urban merchant and entrepreneurial classes 
constituted a shrinking portion of the tax base because as a reward for their 
earnest participation in party politics they had been partially exempted from 
contributing. Furthermore, during the whole century tax evasion had been 
common and speculation rampant, urban businessmen becoming professional 
creditors whose major client was, quite frequently, the state itself.199 
For more than a few among the upper classes, the downside of militarismo 
was precisely its attempt to impose taxes regardless of party loyalties. 
Colorado businessmen who had expected deferential treatment at the hands 
of the Latorre government were disappointed. Thus, while on the one hand 
the economic elites could rely more on a government which was sympathetic 
to development, on the other the new state wanted to impose heavier taxation 
regardless of party loyalties. This made party rule under renovated, more 
'modern' parties, still appealing. Among other things, as a response to these 
new opportunities, by the beginning of the 1880s the parties had begun a deep 
process of renovation intended to make their appeal stronger. Politicians 
representing the financial sectors of Montevideo remained in the leadership; 
Latorre's policies had mainly favoured producers rather than financial 
capitalists or speculators, who were still at the core of urban business and at 
the heart of political activity. 
Ironically, therefore, militarismo ended up making the parties stronger by 
facilitating alliances between principistas and the old caudillos, and between 
some doctors and candomberos. By the late 1870s the traditional opposition 
between candomberos and doctors within the parties had led to an 
identification of both parties as candomberos while the principistas leading 
the partidos de ideas were perceived as the true doctors. The parties that 
reemerged in 1886 at the time of the brief presidency of Francisco A. Vidal 
(1880-82) had been transformed. Despite internal divisions, the Colorado 
Party in particular could boast a combination of traditional caudillos who 
secured the loyalties of the masses in the countryside, together with a bright 
group of urban doctors who gave the party a much-needed ideology and 
agenda. From this point to the reforms of the 1900s the party, although a 
loose assortment of groups, rallied together because of an alliance that had 
succeeded in securing power and keeping the Blancos in the minority. From 
the point of view of state-building, the development of political parties 
remained a necessary tribulation. Under the Latorre administration, and even 
more so during the subsequent military regimes, the state still relied on party 
networks to perform basic functions. In 1882, during the first year of the 
Santos Presidency, rural caudillos seemed to have been as strong as ever and 
party networks determined the relations of the state with the localities 
through the jefes politicos. The immunity and independence of the latter has 
been abundantly documented by newspapers and reports of all sorts. An 
interesting summary was assembled by the Foreign Ministry in Madrid in 
May 1882. At the centre of attention was the murder of large numbers of 
Spanish citizens in the interior that, despite pressures from the whole of the 
diplomatic body and from local citizens, had gone unpunished because of the 
power of local political bosses: 
'Mr. Llorente [Consul] testified that he has confidentially asked 
General Santos to eliminate from the list of candidates to the 
Chamber of Deputies the names of the Jefe Politico of 
Tacuarembo, Manuel Suarez, who has had an active part [in these 
assassinations]. The General refused to take this matter in his 
hands; instead, he has imprisoned Suarez's negro assistant, 
Melitone, who is now charged with the perpetration of the crime. 
Mr. Llorente spoke with the Supreme Judge of Crime ...who 
confidentially disclosed that... the Executive protects... the 
Tacuarembo and other political bosses [Durazno, San Fructuoso] 
who have been elected Deputies solely with the vote of soldiers 
and guards...'200 
Expected corruption in the countryside had partisan connotations. On 25 
February 1882, Llorente had reported that, unlike many others, in the 
Departamento de Florida '...the political boss has done justice' simply 
because the jefe politico was a Blanco while the others belonged to the 
Colorado party. 
President Santos (1882-86), while more militarist in the sense that he 
increased the number of military men participating in decision-making and 
further sought to professionalise the army, was, from the point of view of his 
Partido Colorado, more of a partisan than Latorre had ever been. Santos 
increased the number of rank-and-file soldiers to about 3,000 and created 
both the Military Code of 1884 and a much more technologically oriented 
Military Academy.201 Yet, recognising the power of the parties, and while 
War Minister in 1884, he had personally organised his Gran Partido 
Colorado. At the peak of his military regime, he honoured himself with the 
title of Jefe del Gran Partido Colorado and, while he consulted frequently 
with his party (a pattern dutifully followed by his successor Maximo Tajes), 
Santos was notoriously harsh in his dealings with parties that challenged the 
predominance of Colorados and Blancos (such as the Partido Radical and the 
Partido Constitucional). In order to maintain peace agreements, Santos 
acknowledged only the Blanco party as the legally recognised opposition. To 
be sure, Blanco caudillos, perceiving in Santos a leader amenable to re-
organising the old party system, supported him in his attempt to eradicate the 
other parties. It was not by chance that, when the Latorre period ended, 
Blanco caudillo Timoteo Aparicio wrote to Santos (July 1880) endorsing his 
political views and assuring his lasting support and friendship because, after 
all, he was 'neither a principista nor a nationalist; just a Blanco and a true 
personal friend'.202 After the governments of Santos and Maximo Tajes 
(1886-1890), the political parties and the political class had grown stronger. 
Because Santos alienated important sectors of the political elite, while at the 
same time failing to be as thorough in economic matters as Latorre had been, 
a climate of continuous and increasing tension characterised his regime. The 
state budget showed a growing fiscal deficit. While in 1882 the deficit was 
3,000,000 pesos, by the end of his tenure in 1886 this figure had increased 
to 12,000,000 pesos. Victim of an assassination attempt at the Cibils Theatre 
less than a year before the end of his term, when an ex-lieutenant shot him 
in the face, Santos incarnated the instability of militarismo. Some observers 
disagreed. The Italian charge d'affaires in Montevideo, for instance, on 25 
January 1884, stated that despite Santos being a member of the Colorado 
party he 
'...behaves impartially between the two parties...and, in 
comparison with the Latorre government, General Santos's 
administration is much better, stable and democratic'.203 
By the end of his period, however, he had been forced to open a dialogue 
with his most hated political enemies among the principistas and 
constitucionalistas; in fact, a few months before he stepped down from 
office, three important leaders in the opposition had been given appointments 
in his government.204 Tajes, as critical of Santos as the latter had been of 
Latorre, completely opened the door to the political elite and restricted the 
military budget trying to reverse, in part, the fiscal allocations made by 
Santos. His so-called Minister of Government was Julio Herreray Obes, who 
from that ministry prepared his own election as President in 1890. In 1887 
he was described as an 
'...extremely astute politician, whose political position is to go to 
extremes in order to support the Colorado Party. Proof of that is 
his favourite saying that "up the mast of the republic's ship, the 
flag of the old Partido Colorado". In fact, in April, during the 
celebration of the Crusade of the 33, he managed to place the flag 
of the Colorado Party on top of the so-called electricity tower, 
higher than the Government House which showed the national 
flag.'205 
If anything, Tajes marked the last transitional phase from the mixed form 
of military and civilian rule inaugurated by Latorre to an open return to 
civilian predominance which reduced the role of military men in government 
even further. The large and important Quinto Batallon de Cazadores had 
grown under Santos and become his major base of support within the army. 
After Santos stepped down, one of the targets of the anti-Santos political elite 
(which at this point had grown considerably to include even members of his 
now defunct Gran Partido Colorado) was the reduction in size of this 
battalion. Furthermore, because the battalion publicly expressed loyalty to 
Santos and lamented his absence as a great loss for the army, his officers 
became the targets of an anti-Santos campaign that Tajes only encouraged. 
On 28 December 1886, Tajes made a crucial decision: he decreed the 
dissolution of both the battalion and the presidential escort corp, also loyal 
to Santos. At the same time, Julio Herrera y Obes had successfully furthered 
the recruitment of officers by the Colorado party. In a situation in which the 
professional military felt divided loyalties after three administrations led by 
generals during which they had fared not much better than under Colorado 
tutelage, Herrera y Obes and his supporters, helped by the strong anti-Santos 
coalition that backed Tajes within the army, succeeded in developing 
civilismo. This was a system that took advantage of the centralisation of 
power in the executive granted by the 1830 Constitution to forge a lasting 
alliance with key elements within the military and the upper classes using the 
Colorado party as a vehicle. The two main objectives of the movement were 
to eliminate the old caudillos and militarismo. Propitious conditions to 
achieve both resulted from the events just discussed and from the very nature 
of the horizontal alliances that had provided the backbone of political 
mobilisation in Uruguay since the beginning of the century. 
IV. Political Institutions, the Fears of the Elite 
and the Mobilisation of the Rural Poor 
The notion that elite coalition behaviour may be triggered by what elites 
perceive as threats coming from below has been both an ancient and 
controversial notion. There is no certainty, for one thing, that ruling elites 
feel something similar to 'shared fear' nor that it would be enough to 
determine behaviour even if they did. Guillermo O'Donnell proposed the 
notion of 'perceived levels of threat' as a way to understand better the violent 
reaction against the populace that characterised the military regimes of the 
1970s in the Southern Cone. To put it simply, comparisons among different 
countries seemed to prove that the more mobilised the population before the 
coup, the more repressive the regime after the military takeover, and the 
more willing interest groups are to enter into coalitions with the far right.206 
More recently, Carlos Waisman has put forward a similar argument to 
explain the economic decline of Argentina.207 In the 1940s, Juan D. Peron 
and state corporatism was the option that appealed most to the economic 
elites not because of their belief that this would be the best development 
option, but rather because of what they perceived as a serious threat from 
below (particularly an 'activated' labour movement). For the development of 
Argentina the consequences were devastating. Volatile as it may appear -
certainly this factor cannot be measured - the experience of state-building in 
Uruguay supports the notion that fear motivates elites' behaviour and 
contributes to explain political alliances and institutional crafting. In the 
context of a sharp urban/rural cleavage, a state of permanent war, a weak 
military and several attempts of revolution from below, parties that could 
control unruly masses became the key dominant forces. 
Fear of party wars and rural mobilisation lay at the heart of the Uruguayan 
institutions of government. Real de Azua long argued that the 1830 
Constitution had pursued two main objectives. These were the demobilisation 
of the rural masses and to make a 'political outcast of the military 
establishment'.208 Very much like the first and second Colombian 
constitutions, the intention was to eliminate the 'rural threat' and, at the same 
time, control the loose army that had fought the wars of independence under 
different caudillos.209 These last played a prominent role in the 
establishment of constitutional rule; the very law of the land resulted from a 
pact between the legendary figures of Fructuoso Rivera and Jose A: 
Lavalleja, the latter becoming the first president.210 They divided the 
country into two spheres of influence; while Lavalleja governed the country 
but only dominated the city, Rivera retained the Comandancia general de la 
campafia. For a long time to come politics was to be played between these 
two spheres of influence, a split that would turn even sharper with the Guerra 
Grande. By July 1830 Uruguay had a constitution crafted by doctors, but 
sanctioned by caudillos through what was called 'the generals' pact'. The 
document, however, aimed at eliminating the parties and set limits to their 
power. Rather than an effort towards integration, the first 1830 constitution 
expressed the sharp split existing between doctors and caudillos.2n The 
Constitution survived intact until 1917; one of the reasons for the lack of 
constitutional reform was its rigidity in terms of the procedures it required 
to allow constitutional change212 Another reason, however, was the deep 
political rift that during the nineteenth century divided Congress around the 
issue of constitutional reform. Opinions varied from those who blamed all the 
evils experienced by the country on the form and inspiration of the document, 
to those who feared that Constitutional reform would weaken even further the 
political system and threaten the rule of law. Needless to say, it depended on 
who was in office and who was favoured by the centralised structure of 
power - with the President at its apex - that the Constitution had 
designed.213 Thus, while the Colorados by and large were supporters of the 
original 1830 design, the Blancos, principistas, constitucionalistas, and at 
times the military frequently asked for constitutional reform. In its origins a 
document conceived by urban doctors, the constitution expressed the position 
of those who, many argued, could not see what was really going on 'beyond 
the citadel'.214 At the time in which it was written, although one of its basic 
precepts was the freedom to organise politically, the Constitution made clear 
that party bickering was perceived as the cause of all problems. These were 
the parties of caudillos, the old Colorado and Blanco organisations based on 
voluntary militia and generals trained in the battle field; these were the 
parties that recruited followers from the poorest and most 'barbaric' areas of 
the countryside; these were the parties identified with rural conflict, 
economic stagnation and the disturbance of the peace. In a word, the parties 
that represented all that the urban Montevideo did not wish to be. Therefore, 
the \S30s Asamblea Constituyente managed to impose a foreign governor in 
the presidential post (J. Rondeau) who was thought to be impervious to 
caudillo and party influence.215 Many attempts to eliminate the parties 
followed. Formulas varied. At several points, from Buenos Aires, Colorado 
and Blanco parties in exile favoured the establishment of a moderate 
monarchy. In Montevideo several 'schemes' were considered to solve the 
'unsettled conditions of that country'. Included among them were: 
(i) Becoming an Italian Protectorate 
(ii) Becoming a British Protectorate 
(iii) Forming a combined Protectorate of European Powers 
(iv) Becoming a monarchy under an Italian or British Prince 
(v) Becoming a monarchy under the aegis of Brazil.216 
Most of these initiatives came from the city; according to a contemporary 
source, the Montevideo elites wanted the 
'neutralization of Montevideo as a free port like Hamburg, the 
interior of the republic being left to manage its own affairs as best 
it can'.217 
Although in all truth both caudillos and doctors needed one another to 
cement the parties and to control constituencies, the most frequent cause of 
party divisions were clashes between these two. At the time of the defence of 
Montevideo, doctors such as Herrera y Obes and Andres Lamas confronted 
the caudillista practices of Rivera. During the caudillo regime of Flores, 
'fusionistQi doctors plotted an insurrection that brought caudillo M. Oribe to 
support the President, while doctors in both parties fought against the 
military-caudillista factions in the insurrections of El Quebracho and the 
Tricolor. And of course caudillos within the parties often plotted against the 
doctors. It was in part to curtail the political influence of caudillos that the 
Constitution excluded the rural masses from voting. Article 11 established 
that 'wage-paid peons, paid servants, rank-and-file soldiers, and vagrants' 
could not vote.218 This, of course, was a common feature to most 
constitutions in the region, yet in a rural society in which labourers developed 
no ties to the land, most of the workforce fitted into the category of 
'vagrants'.219 'Progressive' positions like those characterising North 
American liberalism or Colombian and Chilean defenders of non-restricted 
universal suffrage were virtually absent in the constitutional debate. It is 
interesting to note that by 1857 Argentina had extended the franchise to all 
males without restriction, in this way following the lead of the province of 
Buenos Aires (so similar to the Banda) who had earlier adopted this measure 
in the 1820s. On this issue, therefore, Argentina and Uruguay offer a sharply 
contrasting picture. A simple but sound explanation of these differences 
would be to argue that in Argentina the fear of rural insurrections was much 
less. Having a professional army in place and with a higher pace of economic 
growth that made elites more confident, apprehension about caudillismo and 
challenges from below diminished.220 In Uruguay, most principistas were 
uncomfortable with 'daring' versions of liberalism which seemed not to 
adjust to the country's needs. As the influential Juan Carlos Gomez put it as 
late as 1876: 
'That is why I reject universal suffrage...[and the direct election 
of authorities]..because..they mean the artificial symmetry of 
what in reality is asymmetrical and a route to mediocrity...If the 
yankees wanted to escape the predominance of mediocrity and 
remedy the harmful effect that the democratisation of certain 
functions have caused in the great republic, they ought to 
eradicate both things at the same time, things that have been 
introduced in the political world with more originality than 
discernment.'221 
As late as 1887 only five per cent of the population was able to cast ballots 
and in the countryside those enjoying citizenship rights were even fewer. As 
a caudillo complained ' [the number of voters were] less that the fingers of my 
right hand'. Small rural proprietors and the men who had participated in the 
wars of independence were, as Pivel Devoto wrote, 'neither electors nor 
elected'.222 
Constitutional measures to weaken caudillo rule, however, backfired. 
Because the measures demanded that voters cast their ballot orally (voto 
cantado) this inadvertently contributed to increase caudillos' control. 
Literacy and property requirements limited rural participation further since 
illiteracy was much higher there and those who were indebted or had pending 
business with the state more numerous. This strengthened clientelism because 
it reinforced the role of caudillos as the only linkage between those who lived 
on their estancias and the central government. While caudillos perceived 
constitutional legality as a trick of the doctors to rob them of influence, its 
provisions encouraged party organising and favoured their influence.223 
Caudillos therefore declined not by virtue of any specific acts of the 
Constitution, but as a result of the alliances that they were forced to establish 
with the doctors in the late 1870s. 
Fear of parties and gauchos was rooted in the behaviour of pressure groups 
as well. Barran and Nahum amply document that the Asociacion Rural lived 
in permanent fear of a serious revolt. Many of its members connected events 
in Europe (especially the French Revolution) with dangerous insurrections at 
home, where the absence of both an indigenous bourgeoisie and a strong 
state, combined with the barbaric character of the possible insurrection 
seemed to make matters worse.224 The example of the United States and 
Europe convinced the Asociacion that gauchos and their leaders should be 
converted into farmers or a class of small agriculturalists. Widespread 
versions of nineteenth century racism were confirmed by the frequency of 
'revolutions' involving mix-bloods, zambos and indians; not surprisingly, 
contemporaries depicted them as a violent and unpredictable rabble of the 
worst kind. Even in countries that had received plenty of European 
migration, foreigners argued that the racial mix of Spanish America left a lot 
to be desired. Lorenzo Chapperon, the Italian Vice-Consul described racial 
traits in the country in the following way: 
'The normal race of the Oriental people is Caucasian, imported 
from Europe, [yet mixed with].. Arab; .. it can be recognised by 
its thick black hair, ...its long sharp teeth and its brown colour, 
its tall height, and its nomadic habits,... its perverse and cunning 
gist, its repugnance for useful work with the exception of some 
simple pastoral habits; to this family belong the men who reside 
in the vast open spaces of Spanish America, vagabond and semi-
savage people called gauchos'. 225 
Apprehensive of such 'mixed-blood vagrants', various regimes pleaded to 
party leaders to avoid them, which resulted in reinforcing overall party 
authority and the position of the caudillos. Though both were mistrusted, 
they were reluctantly accepted as the only effective control over those from 
'outside the citadel'. 
What were the reasons behind rural mobilisation? Although from a factor 
or mode of production standpoint different causes have been adduced to 
explain mobilisation and revolution, violence has been present in all rural 
settings regardless of the use of labour. On the one hand, it has been 
observed that in complex labour-intensive rural economies with scarce 
availability of land, conflict tends to be high. Examples can be found in 
Central America, Asia or Europe. Village life organised in sedentary 
communities facilitates resistance to state policies and may even be a cause 
of well-organised from-the-bottom-up rebellions. Revolutions, or at least the 
classic ones (China, Russia, France), typically occurred in settings in which 
large numbers of those who joined the revolutionary forces were dispossessed 
small landowners, frustrated agriculturalists who were denied access to land 
and, very importantly, small proprietors who had lost land to the advances 
of larger landowners and wanted to recover what they had lost. 
On the other hand, violence and intense mobilisation also characterised 
frontier pastoral economies with no peasantry, scarce farms, minimal 
instances of slavery and no complex sharecropping arrangements. Labour-
extensive cattleraising is likely to trigger explosions of violence caused by 
nomadic horsemen (,gauchos, llaneros, etc.) who are not only resentful 
towards the white elites, but who are also militarily capable of becoming 
instant soldiers.226 The result is as much violence and perhaps more 
'barbarism' than in more complex peasant economies. Although the nature 
of this system of production requires only a minimal number of workers, the 
need for protection from bandits and other ranchers demands a watchful staff 
to ensure that herds can expand without reinvestment (very much the case in 
Uruguay) and can help alleviate the threat of cattle hunters, while at the same 
time making raids upon the cattle of others. Unlike labour-intensive peasant 
economies and despite the Reglamento de Tierras of the Artigas revolution, 
most of the labour force who were mobilised in Uruguay were not landless 
peasants or agriculturalists eager to settle down on their own small plots. 
Highly unstable markets for agricultural producers in a cattleraising country 
at war together with well-established prejudices against agricultural work, 
which was perceived as an activity that 'only gringos would do', prevented 
peons from seeing themselves as farmers. Better living conditions on the 
estancias, higher pay, the spoils of war and a skilful patron with enough 
influence to deliver the goods were major incentives for the militia who 
joined the patriadas. A distinguishing feature of Uruguay was that, while 
vagrant cowboys perpetuated the idea of a life of emancipation and the belief 
in 'cheap meat and freedom', this situation was similar to the mobilising 
patterns of the Venezuelan llanos, and those 'cowboys' working in the Rio 
Grande do Sul region in Brazil, the Province of Entre Rios and of Buenos 
Aires in Argentina, and in the North of Mexico; yet in the Banda they did so 
as the rank and file of two major parties, thereby contributing to the 
foundation of parliamentary rule. Outcomes in other frontier economies were 
different.227 
Leaders benefited from parties because parties provided the organisational 
structures that both kept the rural poor at bay and allowed the leaders direct 
access to pressure government. In the eyes of townsmen parties represented 
a setback, but were considered preferable to the uncontrolled bands of 
vagrants that frequently preyed on the under-protected townspeople. For 
large numbers of landowners business success meant enforcing minimal 
property rights and maintaining effective military control over their clientele. 
A relevant factor to explain successful party recruitment seems to have been 
rural unemployment. Barran and Nahum have argued along these lines. They 
maintain that the high rates of unemployment (caused by the enclosures of the 
estancias during the 1870s) were highly important in explaining why large 
numbers of rural males joined the patriadas. Small and medium-sized 
proprietors had to sell, while gauchos and renters were forced to leave the 
haciendas,228 Barran and Nahum calculate that in the 1870s about ten per 
cent of the rural population of the country was unemployed. No doubt this 
partially accounts for the success of caudillos in recruiting militia. 
I said 'partially' because, first, the barbed wire fence only encouraged a 
trend that had been there since independence, for levels of rural mobilisation 
had been quite high long before the enclosures. Second, unemployment 
figures were not, comparatively speaking, much higher than those suffered 
by the similar economy of Argentina, where the rural population did not form 
the backbone of political parties and mobilised much less. Certainly on both 
shores of the River Plate many testimonies indicate that urban elites wished 
to exclude the 'barbaric countryside' from state affairs, but in Argentina (at 
least in the Province of Buenos Aires) the countryside seemed more under 
control than in Uruguay. Despite the sharp exclusion that Sarmiento had 
depicted between townsmen and horsemen in his Facundo: o la civilization 
y la barbarie (1845), in Argentina the effects of a rural-based revolutionary 
movement had not taken such a clear form as in the Artigas revolution and 
the uprisings that followed.229 
In explaining party development some other factors should be discussed. 
First, I would argue that a very important clue for understanding party 
development lay more with the leaders than with the followers. As we shall 
see in the next section, divisions among the rural elites created a very active 
body of hacendado-caudillos, most of them military men, who were forced 
to rally to the support of their clientele. Second, fear also played a role 
locally. While the apprehension of the city vis-a-vis the unruly countryside 
is apparent, caudillos' consternation with the prompt reaction of the masses 
and the climate of intimidation created by rowdy local rank and file is not that 
obvious. The need to recruit militia in the context of war and a weak state 
was only encouraged by misgivings about gauchos and peons of all kinds who 
were not easy to dominate and who very likely would join the next-door 
enemy forces or remain in hiding when war efforts most required them. 
Loyalties had to be monitored frequently by calls to war and a reinforcement 
of party identity. A good description of the efficiency of local political bosses 
was published in 1832 by the newspaper El Universal reporting on the so-
called 'Convention of Rivera': 
'Since the 5th of June orders had been given to the [Colorado] 
political bosses of different Departamentos...[they] have 
responded with incredible speed. The jefe from San Jose arrived 
to the meeting point with 207 men from different districts of his 
Departamento... Major Santa Ana with 70 from his 
[Departamento] and Captain Benito Ojeda with 122 from his area. 
Many more are expected in the following days'.230 
In this context, political organising became a requisite to survival and 
constant monitoring of smaller, challenging caudillos a necessity. 
Agreements of mutual protection linked caudillos in the parties, and since no 
single protector could guarantee victory against a powerful rival, horizontal 
alliances materialised nationally based on the old cleavages that were based 
on regional alliances. 
V. The Weakness of the Conservative Coalition 
If structural explanations are of any use to understand collective action and 
thereby the development of political institutions in Uruguay, it is in the 
composition of the landed classes that we find important structural variables. 
Divisions among the owners of the means of production were to a great extent 
responsible for party development and the weak resistance to democratic 
reform. While Argentina bred a tightly coherent ruling coalition, intimately 
linked with its pampean elite, in Uruguay the livestock sector presented a 
different picture.231 As mentioned above, the Rosas regime in Argentina 
contributed a starkly contrasting picture. John Lynch has shown that by the 
1830s the Argentine dictator had centralised power with the support both of 
rural elites and masses, becoming 4Caudillo of Caudillos''.232 Nothing like 
this occurred in Uruguay, where by contrast coalitions of landowners and 
their constituencies struggled unsuccessfully for predominance. Because of 
their effort, 'barbaric' as they were, the parties eventually prevented the 
consolidation of what Barrington Moore has called 'reactionary 
configurations'. Unfolding divisions within the landed elites contributed to 
this development. From the end of the Guerra Grande onwards, one can 
argue that landowners were basically divided into three groups. 
The first group consisted of large estanciero-caudillos of Creole origin 
who, by and large, owned estates in the north, central and western regions 
of the country, closer to the Brazilian border and geographically further away 
from Montevideo. Their ties with the Brazilian market were solid, often 
crossing contraband cattle across the border. International markets via 
Montevideo were also available to them, but as a result of their refusal to 
cross-breed (which lowered the competitiveness of their cattle) and their 
traditional mistrust of urban intermediaries, they tended to participate in 
those markets much less. Their party loyalties shifted between Brazil and 
Argentina. Strong anti-city feelings ran high among these estancieros, their 
base of power being their strong clientele. For example, during the Brazilian-
Portuguese struggle of the late 1810s, they fought Montevideo under the 
Colorado banner, while during the Guerra Grande large numbers 
consolidated positions as leaders of the Blanco party. Venancio Flores, on the 
other hand, was able to recruit some of these landowners for his Brazilian-
backed Colorado crusade on a regional basis. The point here is that, though 
their participation in wars and armed insurrections was high, they were only 
part-time producers, and were motivated by the spoils of war and the 
possibilities of advancement in a political career that occupied a good part of 
their time taken up in rallying support. Indeed, provoked by the 
encroachment of doctors within the parties, their militancy increased during 
the second half of the nineteenth century. From the Flores revolt (1863) to 
the Aparicio Saravia uprising (1904), officers were predominantly 
estancieros of this sort.233 
Very close politically to these estancieros and often depending on their 
patronage, was the so-called minifundio ganadero, a legacy of the Artigas 
revolution. Between 1830 and the late 1870s, available data indicate an 
increasing number of landless hacendados who legally possessed no land, but 
owned considerable numbers of cattle.234 Weak enforcement of land 
property rights allowed them to produce for the market without owning large 
estates. Some of them even became opulent cattle owners, free-riding on 
somebody else's property or on state (fiscal) pastures. When in the early 
1850s the government attempted to enforce the rural code and carried out 
land enclosures, they strongly opposed the city and became alienated from the 
large estancieros tied to urban business. Urban and rural entrepreneurs 
perceived this sector as an obstacle to progress and potentially revolutionary. 
Confirming their fears, the minifundistas remained in no condition - or did 
not deem it necessary - to invest in new breeds of cattle or increase 
production. 
A third group of landowners, reluctant to participate in revoluciones de 
partido and anxious to promote state centralisation and development, 
consisted of those who established close linkages with the urban upper 
classes. Large numbers of them were traders and owners of industry who 
engaged in export agriculture; in other words, they embodied the familiar 
picture of an urban-rural coalition. In terms of composition, however, this 
group changed substantially in the aftermath of the Guerra Grande. At that 
time, a wave of foreigners of European origin obtained large haciendas from 
the old patriciado who, broken by the war, became urban politicians. Already 
before the war foreign producers had been a common feature of the 
landscape. By the 1830s British, Spanish, Italian and Portuguese owners were 
part of the large estancieros. Hacendados of Portuguese-Brazilian origin 
alone constituted a significant proportion (40%) of the landed class in very 
important departments such as Salto, Artigas and Rivera. This was the group 
that during the Guerra Grande and its aftermath Benjamin Poucel described 
as living in fear of expropriation and struggling to remain neutral in a 
constant war-like political climate dominated by the parties of caudillos'235 
While most foreigners were not coerced to serve in the 'voluntary' battalions 
of Colorados or Blancos or the National Guard, 'Spaniards ...who (at the 
time) had no Consul' were in fact forced to serve in the army.236 This was 
also the group that had to make pacts both with loose gaucho 'malefactors' 
and the parties in order not to be the constant victim of plunder. In addition, 
parties, the army and unruly local leaders were constantly draining their 
labour force, sometimes leaving them only with women, children and foreign 
personnel to attend the business of the estanciaP1 Not surprisingly, by the 
end of the Guerra Grande foreign landowners despised politics and perceived 
it as the cause of all problems. 
In the postwar new wave, even larger numbers of British, French and 
German livestock producers aggressively pursued sheep-raising (the so-called 
wool revolution). Hence the prominence of foreign landowners when in the 
1850s and 1860s sheep-raising transformed the Uruguayan rural economy, 
in particular in the littoral regions nearby the city - the Departments of 
Soriano and Colonia. We know that by the 1860s British, German and French 
hacendados represented ten per cent of that class in these Departments and 
the Department of Rio Negro. By the close of the century, the proportion of 
foreign estancieros had increased; by 1900, the Censo Ganadero indicated 
that Uruguayan-born ranchers constituted only 64 per cent of the ranching 
elite and that they controlled only 45 per cent of livestock production. 
Therefore, foreign estancieros represented 36 per cent of the landed elite and 
possessed 55 per cent of the cattle.238 
These cleavages within the rural economy undermined the possibility of 
strong alliances among the landed elites and also weakened the political 
participation of the rural sector as a whole. Very importantly, such cleavages 
facilitated control of the parties by the less entrepreneurial sectors of the 
hacendados. These last invested more in political influence than in their rural 
enterprises. Since returns were not measured in terms of productivity by 
hectare but, rather, in terms of land rent, the large landowner on the borders 
of Brazil and the northern parts of the country, without risking investment 
ventures could obtain as much return as the more business-oriented proprietor 
of the south or the littoral. This was an economy in which large land 
ownership was the major goal of the Creole upper classes, politics providing 
a vehicle to acquire and maintain control of immense extensions of land. As 
Barran and Nahum have noticed, 
Traditional society offered in Uruguay much more resistance [to 
entrepreneurship]...The reason was simple...faced with two 
estancieros, the entrepreneurial and the primitive, the first had to 
invest large sums [of money] to obtain yields that the second, 
without so much effort, could obtain as well.'239 
Foreign ownership of the means of production was important, but not 
because of the usual reasons stated by dependency or world system theory; 
it was relevant because it contributed to the monopoly of the political scene 
by the less entrepreneurial sectors of the Creole elite, therefore promoting the 
rise of a state that operated relatively autonomously from foreign and Creole 
entrepreneurs. Foreign-born estancieros refused to participate in the parties 
and all in all remained aloof from politics, which resulted in weaker linkages 
between the most modern sectors of the rural elites and the state. This 
imported component of the landed upper classes retained their native 
citizenship, regarded party politics as a corrupt and backward practice and 
above all did not want to take risks in a political career that would require the 
acquisition of Uruguayan citizenship. Becoming a national would have meant 
higher taxes and the loss of some privileges - in terms of port usage and 
taxes, for instance - that only foreigners enjoyed, not to mention the 
frightening thought of being eligible for the draft. In addition, foreigners 
regarded their respective embassies and charges d'affaires as being much 
more reliable authorities than the very government, that had repeatedly acted 
in an inefficient and corrupt manner in defending their interests 240 Foreign 
ranchers also had access to pressure groups, such as the Asociacion Rural or 
later the Rural Federation, plus other organisations established by their 
different national communities; they made these organisations the main 
instruments through which to voice their interests. True, they found partidos 
de ideas and principismo much more palatable, but all in all they remained 
outside party structures. 
Therefore, the state grew more dependent on parties composed of rural 
caudillos and doctors whose ties to exporters were not direct. State 
dependence grew stronger for those indigenous estancieros who were 
reluctant to invest in new pastures or breeding because their major income 
came from war. In the renewed party structure of the 1880s, these caudillos 
allied with doctors whose ties to the export economy were also indirect or, 
at most, reduced to the representation of urban merchants. This explains the 
'relative' autonomy of the state from the entrepreneurial landed groups up 
until that decade, a time in which consensus over the advantages of 
participating in the British-controlled beef trade within the political elites 
finally favoured exporters. Consensus resulted from the increasing influence 
of the principistas and almost a decade of relative peace and militarism in 
which the parties became even closer to urban interests. State autonomy and 
the predominance of parliamentary rule that characterised the 1890s and the 
early 1900s was a result of this political vacuum that characterised the 
relation between the strongest sectors of the exporting economic elite and the 
state. It was this vacuum which, extending from the wars of independence to 
the 1870s, permitted the caudillos to permeate and dominate the state. Unlike 
Argentina and with the exception of some notables during the Latorre regime, 
very few members of the most entrepreneurial body of ranchers even sat in 
the Camaras or gained political visibility. 
In these divisive circumstances it was hardly surprising that a rightist, 
conservative bloc never emerged and that a conservative party did not 
consolidate; the state remained staffed, for the most part, with politicians 
who did not directly belong to the most entrepreneurial sectors of the rural 
economy. To make analogies linking the Blanco party with conservative 
groups elsewhere would be misleading. A well-structured Conservative 
ideology was lacking; historiography that has focused on the Blanco party and 
consciously looked into its roots and development coincide in that, if 
anything, it was, at times, more reformist and anti-status quo than the 
Colorados.241 In the final analysis there was neither a body of Conservative 
doctrine backing the Blancos, nor a party organisation supported by the 
traditional pillars of conservatism in Latin America: the Church and the old 
agrarian elite. After the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767 the only remaining 
order, the Franciscans, collaborated more with the cause of independence and 
liberalism than with conservatism.242 And in terms of the older, more 
'traditional' hacendados, this group can be said to have supported both 
Colorados and Blancos. If the ideological persuasion of the Blancos was 
different from conservatives elsewhere, so were their tactics; they opposed 
Colorado rule in ways that resembled more the vaguely reformist bourgeois 
Argentine Union Civica Radical party or populist movements than right 
wingers associated with the status quo.243 In fact, as Barran and Nahum 
suggest, for large sectors of the Uruguayan population of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries the Blanco party had been the party that had fought 
against Colorado centralism for universal suffrage, equal participation, and 
democracy.244 Hence the absence of a clear Conservative/Liberal divide; 
the parties made no public declaration of liberalism or conservatism and in 
fact both of them adhered to a grey, mild version of the two. As late as the 
1870s the Colorado party, assumed to be the liberal pole of the party system, 
did not have a more liberal political platform than the Blancos245 
Economic policy reflected the weakness of the traditional 
conservative/liberal divide. It was the supposedly more liberal Colorados 
who became strongly protectionist after the 1910s, while the Blancos 
expressed a very unclear position on economic policy altogether. In reality, 
both parties pursued a simplistic version of free-trade economics which they 
accepted up until the early twentieth century. What party leaders understood 
about tariffs and their overall effects on the economy was really very little; 
for the most part, the position of the parties coincided with that of the 
population at large in supporting free trade, particularly with Europe. Thus, 
economic policy does not provide a reliable variable to explain coalition 
formation. Frustrating as it might be for a large body of political economy 
literature that interprets alliances and policies in terms of the free 
trade/protectionist divide, and although in Uruguay as elsewhere economic 
policy resulted from intense political debate in Congress, by the late 1880s 
these issues were marginal to party agendas and Congressional 
controversy.246 Order, more than free trade or protection, was at the core 
of the interests of business; the Asociacion Rural, for instance, which one 
might have expected to support liberalism, ended up demanding state 
protection for the livestock sector. While a debate about the inappropriateness 
of state intervention in the economic sphere did take place, its role as a 
coercive force able to impose order on market mechanisms and reduce 
uncertainty was welcomed by business. Before the peak of liberalism (1870s 
and early 1880s), revoluciones de partido convinced the economic elites that 
the state should play a major role as an agent of development and protector 
of property rights. The Asociacion Rural, for instance, constantly asked for 
state assistance in the foundation of banks, schools, roads and infrastructure 
in the rural economy.247 By the end of the 1860s the most entrepreneurial 
sectors of the landowning elite still found state growth desirable and 
centralisation of power a crucial need: hence their support for Latorre. Yet 
up until the last decade of the century the history of their plight was a history 
of frustration and discontent and, when they were finally able to gain more 
influence, they did so through painful bargaining with the old political elite 
and the principistas, negotiations that resulted in the control of the state 
apparatus by the latter. 
VI. Conclusions 
Already in the turbulent late 1860s the Spanish Consul in Montevideo 
believed that the Republic was definitely heading towards parliamentary 
democracy and attributed these promising trends to the land-of-new-
settlement characteristics of the country and its loose social structures. Yet 
the lower strata of the population, he observed, had a different perception, 
and expected too much of institutions of government: 
'The lower classes, who are the most numerous, attribute the 
transformations in their state to democratic institutions when, in 
reality, these are just the natural and exclusive result of local 
circumstances.'248 
According to him, these 'local circumstances' were basically structural. 
Rather, previous analysis has shown that the 'local circumstances' that 
acquired paramount importance in shaping the polity included war and 
regional conflicts and had more to do with the characteristics of collective 
action and the type of vertical alliances that parties were able to develop. The 
mode of production, international trade or the characteristics of European 
migration were less consequential, and although they had an effect on the 
polity as well, I have argued that from the wars of independence to the 1880s 
their influence was definitely modest. Structural factors directly related to the 
emergence of democracy and a rather autonomous state in Uruguay were 
more linked to the characteristics of the rural elite. The term 'structure' in 
this account should be used only to highlight the existing divisions among 
sectors of livestock production that resulted in weakening political influence. 
These divisions, however, were not only the product of different types of 
linkages between the rural economy and Montevideo and the international 
market or differences in terms of modernisation, but also the outcome of 
regional vertical alliances between gauchos, peons and patrons. 
The period studied ended in a process of state consolidation under civilian 
hegemony. In 1886 the consolidation of the civili sto-led alliance after the last 
military administration (Maximo Tajes) was ideologically and 
administratively guided by an ethos of liberalism and parliamentarism. 
Institutionally, it was controlled by two parties, with the Colorados in a 
prominent position. Still feeble, the state was nonetheless in the hands of a 
political elite that was relatively disengaged from the most powerful 
economic sectors. This explains not only the fast pace of state growth the 
country experienced in the next decades, but also the tendency of the state to 
become more interventionist and autonomous while still operating within a 
pluralist framework. Internal wars and regional conflict carved party 
cleavages and provoked changes in elite composition that differentiated 
Uruguay from the neighbouring and similar pastoral society of Argentina. A 
particularly important development in this differentiation was the early 
mobilisation of the rural poor and the characteristics taken by the wars of 
independence in the form of the Artigas League. After these wars, the 
revoluciones de partido linked political parties and the military, which 
remained bonded by a strong mutual dependence. At certain points in time, 
the Colorado party and the state developed what Richard Bensel, analysing 
state formation in the United States, has labelled 'unmediated party rule', that 
is, situations in which the state and one party were almost one and the same 
thing.249 All this contributed to the triumph of civilismo, and by the end of 
the period a partisan military had been replaced by civilian predominance. 
In terms of the state and the political parties, a remarkable development 
was that the parties remained strong while at the same time the state showed 
a high degree of autonomy. This is quite an unusual outcome, since the old 
wisdom on the relations between parties and the state has been to see them as 
inversely related: namely, strong state, weak parties; weak state, strong 
parties. If the exceptionality thesis on the development of the country holds 
some truth, it lies in this dynamic between the state and the parties. Yet, it 
is precisely this dynamic that I claim to have explained without appealing to 
exceptionalism but, rather, to comparative history. The pattern just described 
was altered only with the military coup of 1973. 
This study concludes that there was no direct correlation between levels of 
economic development and the economic elites' ability to penetrate the state. 
With regard to the literature on this issue, two hazy hypotheses emerge. One 
is that the higher the level of development, the more the state responds to the 
interests of economic elites. The rise and formation of capitalism is a classic 
example. Higher levels of development created stronger and better organised 
economic elites who in turn were able to control the state more successfully; 
market economies made penetration only the easier. A second hypothesis is 
that the lower the level of economic development, the more likely is the 
existence of an 'oligarchy'. This oligarchy, in control of the means of 
production (or whatever other definition we choose for natural and 
technological resources) has no major problem controlling the state. In this 
situation, the unity of the upper classes and their scarce numbers, in addition 
to the lack of competition from alternative elites, facilitate state control by 
a small group. Agrarian societies which have experienced scant industrial 
development provide typical examples. Evidently, these hypotheses are at 
odds one with another. 
Possible counter-arguments reveal further weaknesses. With the first 
hypothesis, it is possible to respond that as development makes society more 
complex the structure of states also grows more intricate; state bureaucracies, 
therefore, are very likely to acquire more independence, and the service 
sectors and political elites to play a more prominent (and more autonomous) 
role. Thus, state autonomy would very likely increase rather than decrease. 
In the second hypothesis, one can reply that the lower the level of economic 
development, the weaker organised are the economic elites, and the more 
likely it is that strong authoritarian military regime will emerge. Even if 
affected by rapid development, as Samuel Huntington has long suggested and 
as the Uruguayan elites learned, these societies must rely on the only agent 
able to guarantee order and some sort of legality, i.e. the military. Neither 
hypothesis is confirmed in the Uruguayan case. Far from what either 
hypothesis predicts, in the Uruguayan situation, which featured a state mostly 
financially bankrupt in a frontier society, the state was able to establish a 
relative degree of autonomy from the 'oligarchy'. 
A very important question was why in due time the parties did not fade 
away overrun by the forces of modernisation. As they operated for most of 
the nineteenth century, they structured a primitive type of political 
representation that was bound to disappear under the impact of modernity. 
Were the parties that reemerged after the militarism of the late 1880s and 
commanded the political scene in the next century different from the 
traditional Colorados and Blancos or did they basically retain the same 
defining features? My argument has been that parties evolved at a much more 
rapid pace than state institutions and that definitely by the late 1880s they 
represented different levels of composition and organisation. By the same 
token, however, I have also suggested that the core of the parties, i.e. the 
rural clientelistic networks, were reinforced by fear of the lower classes and 
the need for frequent mobilisation. Therefore, while the same organisational 
core remained paramount in the countryside, in the urban environment parties 
adopted different outlooks and formed new alliances with doctors who had 
long opposed the traditional Blancos and Colorados. All this was done in the 
name of the two major parties and on the assumption that the control of the 
countryside was crucial. It was under these premises that the coalitions of the 
late 1880s were consolidated; when at this time the 'traditional' parties 
merged with the partidos de ideas this core remained as their power base up 
until the 1930s. I pointed out that it was because of these networks that 
parties could provide the state with mechanisms of control over the 
departamentos, making state growth possible. In essence, the task of 
modernisation was performed using the old 'traditional' party structures. 
It was through being shaped by these events that the modernisation of 
political institutions in Uruguay took place. According to modernisation 
theory, 'political modernisation' and institutional change result from the 
increasing penetration of the political system by new elites. Such penetration 
was bound to trigger a much more pragmatic competition among 
'subsystems'. Of special importance for the advent of democracy was the 
abandonment of 'traditional' ways and the adoption of more instrumental, 
secular and 'rational' values. Democratic polities resulted from a movement 
towards the rationalisation of authority, which 'always involved change and 
the disintegration of a traditional political system'.250 Two different 
arguments coexist in this school of thought. First, what could be called a 
'development argument' assumed that economic development and a number 
of other factors (literacy, urbanisation, mobilisation, etc.) would increase the 
likelihood of pluralism and democracy. Second, in sharp contrast to the first 
argument stood the 'cultural argument' that assumed that normative 
behaviour and culture lay at the basis of polity formation and explained 
differences between outcomes. 
During its phases of formation before 1886, the Uruguayan political 
system was shaped by the development of those forces that modernisation 
theory had long perceived as inimical to progress and change, forces that lay 
at the core of 'traditional' society. And political culture was more an effect 
than a cause. Parliamentary rule and a party system were made possible by 
clientelistic networks, violence, minimal property rights, a weak state, and 
a group of highly mobilised gauchos. Democracy, if anything, owed as much 
to the barbaric countryside as to the enlightened city. This is not to say that 
modernisation and its repercussions should not be taken seriously. After all, 
it was the modernising alliance under Latorre that was responsible for 
building the infrastructure of the state. But politically the Latorre regime was 
unsuccessful at changing the traditional ways of doing things; partisanship 
was still strong and the political foundations of his regime remained tied to 
the political class and partisan generals. Thus, on a closer look, we can see 
that the foundations of this democracy were established more by its 
'traditional' core than by its modern sector. 
Democracy in Uruguay did not rest on a 'special' kind of political culture 
either. Culture in relation to political behaviour was more a creation of the 
political institutions that emerged from party struggles and the rural/urban 
cleavage than an independent causal factor of democracy. A party culture, so 
to speak, forged during the Artigas struggle and the subsequent conflict, 
contributed to explain party cohesion and the ideological preferences of both 
elites and rank and file. And there was certainly a political behaviour 
associated with the doctors of the camaras bizantinas that could, if one 
wished, be understood as a manifestation of an urban political culture. But 
simple comparisons with the similar culture and society of Argentina would 
suffice to show that political culture, if anything, comes to be a by-product 
of other events. If the political culture argument put forward by land-of-
recent-settlement and modernisation theory has any solid foundation, then 
Argentina and Uruguay, very similar culturally and socially, would have 
developed very similar political institutions. Yet they did not. 
Finally, there was the relation between the polity and the economy. Barran 
and Nahum, operating from a well-documented structural approach, came to 
face the fact that political behaviour operated under a different logic than 
economic behaviour. What that logic was went ignored by the authors. 
Despite this, it is quite clear that the relations between politics and economics 
is not a linear one. In the last analysis, I have insisted that collective action, 
more than economic considerations, shaped the polity. This action, of course, 
took place in a definite setting in which structural factors delineated both its 
substance and scope. Yet I have suggested that a comparison with the similar 
economy of Argentina renders structural determination problematic. Was 
collective action 'rational'? It was, but this confirmation contributes little to 
the solution of our fundamental question. In explaining the formation of the 
political system we have found that, not surprisingly, political conflict 
seemed to respond to rational calculations and material gains. But this 
awareness neither contributes to enhance our knowledge of the 
institutionalisation of power relations, nor does it ease the theoretical 
quandaries that emerge from an historical investigation of Uruguayan 
political development. If we were to argue that the evolution of political 
institutions in Uruguay was the sum of rational actions on the part of 
individuals who acted to maximise their utility, i.e. to achieve their political 
objectives, this still would tell us nothing about their characteristics and 
types. In the final analysis, it would make no difference whether we take a 
rational choice approach, because the theory becomes almost impossible to 
falsify. Stated simply, for more than seventy years the historical record 
shows no record of 'irrationality' against which to measure or contrast 
'rational' actions. Little room would be left for the counterintuitive rich 
evidence that is portrayed by the historical record. Such richness would most 
likely disappear, submerged and forgotten in the monotonous and muddy 
waters of rationality. 
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Appendix 
Presidents of Uruguay, 1830-1907 
General Fructuoso Rivera 
General Manuel Oribe 
General Fructuoso Rivera 
Juan Francisco Giro 
General Venancio Flores 
Gabriel Antonio Pereira 
Bernardo Prudencio Berro 
General Lorenzo Batlle 
Jose E. Ellauri 
Pedro Varela 
Colonel Lorenzo Latorre 
Francisco Vidal 
General Maximo Santos 
Antonio Vidal 
General Maximo Tajes 
Julio Herrera y Obes 
Juan B. Idiarte Borda 
Juan Lindolfo Cuestas 
Jose Batlle y Ordonez, First Presidency 
November 1830 to February 1835 
March 1835 to October 1838 
March 1839 through the Guerra Grande 
March 1852 to September 1853 
March 1854 to September 1855 
March 1856 to March 1860 
March 1860 to March 1864 
March 1868 to March 1872 
March 1873 to January 1875 
January 1875 to March 1876 
March 1876 to March 1880 
March 1880 to February 1882 
March 1882 to March 1886 
March to November 1886 
November 1886 to March 1890 
March 1890 to March 1894 
March 1894 to August 1897 
March 1899 to March 1903 
March 1903 to March 1907 
Notes 
1. Despite instances of corruption and the existence of strong clientelistic 
structures, institutions of government in Latin America have most closely 
resembled the liberal democratic paradigm. 
2. According to Moore, 'reactionary configurations' such as those that 
characterised Germany (a coalition between the old landed elites and the newer 
commercial and industrial bourgeoisie against the lower classes in town and 
countryside) were to be found in most cases. See Moore (1966). 
3. As shown in part IV, in Uruguay no strong conservative organised alliance 
was consolidated. Though efforts to form coalitions were forthcoming, their 
associations were sporadic and no lasting associations endured. 
4. As in modernisation theory, I use the term 'traditional' to indicate that part 
of society characterised by rigid social structures and established values that 
represented the other side of the coin of the newer, modern part. 
5. For details on this aspect of Moore's argument, see Moore (1966), especially 
pp. 418-20. 
6. Contemporaries used other names to refer to the territory today known as 
Uruguay including Banda del Norte, Banda Septentrional or Banda de los 
Charruas; the two first designations expressed the location of Uruguay in 
relation to the capital of the Viceroyalty, Buenos Aires. The latter referred to 
the presence of Charrua nomad indians who originally inhabited that territory. 
7. This right was not passed by Congress immediately, but it was finally 
approved in 1932. 
8. Barran and Nahum (1972), vol. 4, p. 18. 
9. On a neo-corporatist argument, see Lanzaro (1986). On a somewhat ill-
formulated corporatist argument see Weinstein (1975). 
10. For a more extensive critique of the corporatist model as applied to 
Uruguay, see Lopez-Alves (forthcoming, a). 
11. Even then it basically remained, as other countries in the area, an agrarian 
society with only a small industrial bourgeoisie. 
12. Batlle died in 1929, but his political legacy did not. As Henry Finch has put 
it, 'Batllism refers to a national style or ideology of development within which 
Uruguayan public life was conducted from early this century to the end of the 
1960s'; see Finch (1981), p. 2. For most Uruguayan scholars, the so-called 
'Batlle era' started with the first presidency (1902) and ended with the Great 
Depression (1929). 
13. A comprehensive examination of the period 1880-1914, which includes both 
the reforms of the 1890s and those implemented by Batlle, goes beyond my 
purposes in this essay. In collaboration with David Rock I examine this period 
elsewhere as part of an ongoing research project funded by the National 
Endowment for the Humanities. There, we closely compare the social, political, 
and institutional histories of Argentina and Uruguay during these years. 
14. Quijano (1949), p. 292. 
15. Barran and Nahum (1979-85), especially vol. 1. Volumes 1, 2, 3, and 8 
were written jointly. The rest of the collection was written by Jose P. Barran 
alone. 
16. This issue is acknowledged and an explanation of this shift is attempted in 
Barran and Nahum (1979-85). 
17. In my definition a state is autonomous when it can enact policy 
independently from pressure groups; autonomy is, of course, a relative concept. 
18. See, for instance, the figures offered in Finch (1981). 
19. It has been argued that Battle's demagogic machinations vis-a-vis the 
working class hampered the formation of a strong labour party and, ultimately, 
benefited the political elite. See, for example, Sala de Touron and Landinelli 
(1984). 
20. A good example is Julio A. Louis (1969), especially pp. 9-11 and 64-88. 
21. For details, see Lamas and Piotti de Lamas (1981), p. 177. 
22. Although historiography on Latin America has touched tangentially upon 
this subject, few studies specifically related to state formation in Uruguay or on 
Latin America have been conducted. Notable among the few is Oszlak (1985). 
23. The first 1830 constitution remained unchanged until 1917. 
24. Attempts to change the original document abounded (1838, 1842, 1851, 
1853, 1878, and even more frequently during the 1880s). On the Constitutional 
debate of the first half of the nineteenth century, see Sala de Touron and Alonso 
Eloy (1991), vol. 2, pp. 126-7. 
25. Carlos Real de Azua shows this quite eloquently: (1984), p. 74. 
26. For details, see Wood (1992). 
27. From the 1920s prominent colorados (reds) and members of the 
intelligentsia wrote numerous press articles and editorials in the Batllista 
newspaper El Dia that argued for the country as an exceptional case. 
28. On the MLN, see Lopez-Alves (1989). 
29. For a detailed examination of neo-Batllism (and the exceptionality thesis) 
see Lopez-Alves (forthcoming, a). 
30. A brief, but useful, review of this literature can be found in an unfinished 
essay by Carlos Real de Azua (1987). Perhaps because of the unfinished 
character of this manuscript, however, Real de Azua did not develop an 
alternative position. He correctly points out the limitations of the 'classic' thesis 
in terms of the lack of empirical evidence and the absence of a vigorous 
methodological and comparative framework. 
31. Charles Gillespie, for instance, implicitly accepts most of the postulates of 
the exceptional thesis; see, for instance Gillespie (1984), especially pp. 1-5. 
32. In Sala de Touron and Alonso Eloy (1991), vol. 2, pp. 58-107, one can 
find a good description of these nationals. Sala de Touron and Alonso Eloy are 
mentioned here only as a reference; they do not subscribe to this political 
culture argument. 
33. Emphasis on the personality of the gaucho and the struggles of the rural 
populations and rural caudillos in the forging of this special political culture can 
be found in Pivel Devoto (1942); Pivel Devoto (1956), especially vol. 2; Pivel 
Devoto and Ranieri de Pivel Devoto (1948); de Herrera (1984); and Garcia 
(1956). 
34. Among other writings see Bauza (1887); Pivel Devoto (1965), p. 95. 
35. Much later, and in a much more systemic way, dependency theory also 
echoed some of these notions. 
36. Zorrilla de San Martin's novel Tabare: la leyenda patria remains the 
foremost literary epic of the foundation of the nation. It insisted on the mixed 
European and Indian ancestry of the country and stressed the spirit of freedom 
of the original native populations (the Charrua and Chana indians). 
37. For details on this political culture in the United States, see Lipset (1963); 
also, more recently, Lipset (1990). 
38. I discuss this in detail below. 
39. Barran and Nahum (1979-85), vol. 1, p. 109. 
40. Quoted in Reyes Abadie (1977), p. 27. The comparison is interesting 
precisely because the article had been written in the antagonistic city of Buenos 
Aires. 
41. ' Sulla Propieta Territoriale Degli' Italiani Nel Dipartamento di Montevideo', 
Bolletino Consulare, vol. 16 (Rome, Biblioteca Ministere degli Affari Esteri). 
The peak of Italian migration can be established in the late 1860s, early 1870s. 
42. See Barran and Nahum (1979-85), p. 14. 
43. Ibid., p. 36. 
44. Pivel Devoto (1942), especially pp. 58, 207, 209, 224. The strong 
rural/urban cleavage constitutes the main interpretative variable of Uruguayan 
history also in Zum Felde (1920). The same can be argued of Reyes Abadie 
(1990) and (1977). 
45. On the notion of patriciado and its evolution in Uruguay see Real de Azua 
(1961). 
46. Reyes Abadie (1977), p. 51. See as well Barran and Nahum (1979-85), 
chiefly vols. 1 and 3. 
47. The expression became very popular in British Consular Reports on 
Uruguay, which constantly made reference to the chaotic 'and divorced from 
reality' character of Uruguayan politics. For a good example, see Public Record 
Office, FO 51, no. 160, dispatch 20, 16 July, 1870. 
48. See Barran and Nahum (1979-85), vol. 1, p. 158 and passim. The authors, 
however, suggest that the weight of the middle classes was not as important as 
it might appear. 
49. Scholarly work on Uruguay and other countries in the continent has long 
toyed with the idea of a comparison with Europe. Systematic comparisons have 
never materialised, however, except in a rather loose fashion in the literature 
on transitions to democracy. 
50. Martinez Lamas (1946), p. 81. 
51. He argues that a comparison in terms of geography and natural resources 
rather than in terms of culture is called for in order to find an answer to the 
real causes of Uruguayan underdevelopment. Ibid. pp. 86-88. 
52. Some very apparent reasons spring to mind: 1) the explicit bias on the part 
of a dominant Marxist-inspired structural tradition against considering the 
United States as a case for comparison (the United States is still today scarcely 
taught in Latin America); 2) prejudice harboured by scholarly work on the 
United States which for the most part did not consider Latin America as part 
of 'the West', modernisation theory being a good case in point. In sum, 
predominant parochialism on the part of both literatures. In Lopez-Alves 
(forthcoming, b), I venture into this comparison in some detail. 
53. MDAE, document attached to Dispatch 13, Montevideo September 1863, 
Confidenziale, Pacco 357, September 29, 1863. 
54. Bureau of the American Republics, Uruguay, Bulletin no. 61 (Washington, 
DC, 1892), p. 45. 
55. Up until the 1970s such conviction permeated Batllista thinking and was not 
uncommon among the Left and the population at large. 
56. To stress the qualities of leaders to explain political systems and society at 
large is a well-known approach of the social sciences. Popular for some time 
in the literature on Latin America, it has been prominent in scholarly work on 
Colombia, which has the oldest two-party system in the continent besides 
Uruguay. 
57. Vanger (1980a) and (1980b). Charles Gillespie had also been influenced by 
this approach; see Gillespie (1984). 
58. Gonzalez Conci and Guidici (1957), p. 120. 
59. Others have argued that it was the persuasiveness of Batllista discourse that 
helped reform. For a study of this discourse that emphasises the exceptional 
qualities of the leader as well, see Panizza (1990). 
60. On the United States, see the classical work of Frederick J. Turner (1920). 
On Canada, see Innis (1933). 
61. This body of literature has so often remarked on some of these 
characteristics that it would be too long to list references fully in a footnote. 
Among others, good examples are the contributions to Real de Azua (1968a) 
and also Real de Azua (1984). In terms of a structured 'land of recent 
settlement' argument that includes Uruguay, to my knowledge only Donald 
Denoon has incorporated the country in the context of a wider comparison. See 
Denoon (1983). 
62. J. P. Barran and B. Nahum have acknowledged the importance of the 
frontier phenomenon in Uruguay. See Barran and Nahum (1989), p. 76-7. It 
must be added that in terms of their love for freedom and life in the open 
spaces a great part of the indigenous people of the United States have been 
described in very similar terms to those used to depict the Uruguayan and 
Argentine gauchos and Indians. 
63. MAE, Madrid, Uruguay: Asuntos Politicos, no. 24, Legajo 2707. 
64. See Pivel Devoto (1942), especially vol. 1, p. 236 and passim; and (1956), 
vol. 2, in which ideological issues are taken as the major dividing lines between 
the parties. 
65. Although this view has been quite pervasive both in the literature and in 
public opinion, it is difficult to find it in a 'pure' formulation. For arguments 
along these lines see Vargas (1958); McDonald (1978); Pendle (1963); Perez 
Santarcieri (1989); and Weinstein (1975). 
66. For a critique of this characterisation of both parties, see Real de Azua 
(1990). For a description of the different divisions suffered by the Colorados, 
see Pivel Devoto (1956), vol. 2, p. 113 and passim. 
67. Reyes Abadie (1977), notes the unusual influence of liberal ideas in 
Montevideo. Some of the most recent work on Batlle has also acknowledged the 
dominant liberal (and even socialist) content of Batllista discourse as a 
distinctive feature of the Colorados. See Panizza (1990), especially pp. 37-55. 
68. This was discussed above as part of the exceptional country thesis. On the 
influence of liberalism in the United States see Hartz (1955), which is 
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76. Cf. Barran and Nahum (1972), vol. 1, p. 411. The principistas, we should 
remember, were also a part of the old patriciado that the Asociacion regarded 
as part of an old, less entrepreneurial elite. 
77. For details, see Pivel Devoto (1956), vol. 2, p. 137. 
78. Ares Pons (1967), p. 41. 
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